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Article 2

Illinois Courts: Vital Developers of Tort Law As
Constitutional Vanguards, Statutory Interpreters, and

Common Law Adjudicators
Philip H. Corboy,* Curt N. Rodin,** and Susan J.
Schwartz***+

I.

INTRODUCTION

The legislative package, euphemistically entitled the Civil Justice
Reform Amendments of 1995 (the "Reform Act"),' was the most
draconian anti-tort law ever passed. While a constitutional challenge to
the Reform Act was under advisement by the Illinois Supreme Court,
tort reform lobbyists published an article that openly attacked the right
of the court to exercise its mandate of judicial review. 2 The authors
* Partner, Corboy & Demetrio, Chicago, Illinois.
**Partner, Anesi, Ozmon, Rodin, Novak & Kohen, Ltd., Chicago, Illinois.
***Partner, Corboy & Demetrio, Chicago, Illinois.
+Each of the authors is a graduate of Loyola University Chicago School of Law. All
are active members of the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association (ITLA) and are ardent foes
of tort reform or any legislation which erodes the right to trial by jury. Mr. Corboy and
Mr. Rodin have served as president of ITLA. Mr. Rodin was chairman of ITLA's
Constitutional Challenge Committee, which participated in the preparation of
plaintiff's briefs in the constitutional attack on the Civil Justice Reform Amendments of
1995.
1. See Civil Justice Reform Amendments of 1995, Pub. Act No. 89-7 (codified in chs.
430, 730, 735, 740, 745, 815, and 820 of ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. (West 1996)).
2. See Victor E. Schwartz et al., Illinois Tort Law: A Rich History of Cooperation and
Respect Between the Courts and the Legislature, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 745, 746 (1997).
In their article, Mr. Schwartz et al. maintained that the General Assembly created tort law
by adopting the Illinois reception statute. See id. This enactment delegated to state
courts the authority to develop English common law in accordance with the public
policy of Illinois. See id. at 746-47. The legislature retained the right to retrieve its
power to develop or rescind any part of the common law at any time. See id. at 747. The
Reform Act was a legislative policy determination regarding tort law. See id. at 749.
Tort reform statutes in other states were alleged to have been reversed on the assumption
that state courts have a "fundamental and exclusive right to make state tort law." Id. The
authors argued that these decisions were not constitutional because they not only failed
to recognize the reception statutes, but they also were written by judges who merely
substituted their personal opinions regarding public policy for that of the legislature.
See id. at 761. As a matter of history and public policy, the authors posited that the
Reform Act should be respected by Illinois courts. See id. passim. This article is written
in response to Victor E. Schwartz et al., Illinois Tort Law: A Rich History of
Cooperation and Respect Between the Courts and the Legislature, 28 Loy. U. CHI. L.J.
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boldly opined that the Illinois Supreme Court is subservient to the
Illinois General Assembly in its development and interpretation of the
Illinois system of tort law. 3 This suggested emasculation of the
court's right to subject the Reform Act to the protective check of
judicial review violates the institutional separation of powers.4 Under
the separation of powers doctrine, Illinois courts have the affirmative
duty to invalidate special legislation.5 This duty precludes courts from
granting any deference to the legislature when the courts deem a statute
impermissibly arbitrary.6

The Illinois Supreme Court succinctly dismissed the authors'
assertion of an unfettered legislative supremacy in tort law in Best v.
Taylor Machine Works.7 Holding that the Reform Act was
unconstitutional, the court's scholarly and compelling opinion
identified specific aspects of this comprehensive amalgamation that
violated the Illinois Constitution.8 The court found violations of
several constitutional provisions, including the special legislation
clause, 9 the doctrine of separation of powers1 ° and the right to
privacy. 1
This article maintains that the Illinois Supreme Court was correct
when it concluded that the Reform Act failed judicial review. We
caution that the court's opinion should be examined on its merits. This
careful scrutiny will demonstrate that the public should be wary of the
reform advocates' definition of judicial activism as any decision
antithetical to their agenda of lobbying for corporate America. 2 The
745 (1997).
3.
4.
5.

See id. at 746, 761.
See infra Parts II, IV.C.
See infra Part V.A.l.a-b; see also Part IV.B (discussing special legislation, or

special law as it is frequently called, as any law that confers a particular benefit to a
person or limited group of people to the exclusion of others who are similarly situated).
6.

See ILL. CONST. art. II, § 1.

7.

Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1063 (I11. 1997).

8. See infra Part V.
9. See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1071-76; infra Part V.A.I.a.
10. See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1078-79; infra Part V.A.I.b.
11. See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1096-1100; infra Part V.A.4 (discussing Best v. Taylor
Machine Works).

12. The primary author of the article we counter, Victor E. Schwartz, is not only a
torts professor and author of torts treatises, but he has also served as a chief
spokesperson and general counsel for the Product Liability Coordinating Committee
(PLCC), a coalition of Washington representatives of Forbes 100 Companies and
business trade groups, funded by the Business Roundtable, a trade association of the
nation's largest companies. He is also general counsel for the American Tort Reform
Association (ATRA), which openly seeks to change the public's perception of tort
reform.

1999]

Illinois Courts

opposing authors claim that legislative supremacy in the tort arena
hinges on the alleged creation of tort law by the colonial and territorial
legislatures' adoption of reception statutes. 13 As we discuss in Part
III, nothing in these declaratory enactments shackles the exercise of
judicial review.' 4 Further, courts have interpreted that these statutes
have adopted the common law, except where it has been repealed by
legislation or the decisions of common law courts. 5
Although some tort reform advocates label the invocation of state
constitutional guarantees and prohibitions to overrule tort reform as
unprecedented and evidence of state constitutionalism run wild, there
is no need for judicial restraint. 6 Part IV urges that as state courts
grapple with constitutional issues wrought by tort reform statutes, it is
only natural that they look to state law, including state constitutions,
for resolution.' 7
Part V of this article discusses the decision of the Illinois Supreme
Court in Best v. Taylor Machine Works.'" Scrutiny of this decision
compels the conclusion that the court-in the exercise of judicial
review-exercised judicatory judgment and applied the rule of law,
which was grounded in the text, history, and case law of the Illinois
Constitution. 1' Illinois has a strong history of holding invalid as
special legislation any statute that discriminates in an arbitrary manner
between similarly situated individuals without adequate justification or
connection to the purpose of the statute.2 ° Part V maintains that when
the legislature chose to act in defiance of well-established constitutional
common law, it placed the Reform Act at peril because Illinois courts
are expressly vested with the responsibility to determine whether any
13. See infra Part II (challenging Schwartz's proposition regarding the scope of the
legislature's ability to "retrieve" tort law); see also Schwartz et al., supra note 2, at 746752. The authors stated that the reception statutes have been "largely overlooked" in
the debate about who should determine state tort law. See id. at 746. They claimed that
state legislatures "did not have the time" nor "the inclination" to formulate an
exhaustive tort code. Id. at 747. The power to develop common law was delegated to the
judiciary only temporarily and could be retrieved at any time. See id.
14. See infra Part III.
15. See infra Part III; see also Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 117 N.E.2d 74, 79 (Il1. 1954)
(interpreting reception statutes as having adopted the common law except where
repealed by statute or courts); Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Stanford, 15 N.E.2d 616,
616-17 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1938) (generally stating the same); Kinross v. Cooper,
224 I11. App. 111, 115 (Il1. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1922) (stating the same).
16. See Schwartz et al., supra note 2, at 748.
17. See infra Part IV.

18. See infra Part V; Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1103 (I11.
1997).
19. See infra Part V.
20. See infra Part V.A.I.a.2.
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law, tort or otherwise, is special legislation."' The Best court acted
appropriately in holding the Reform Act unconstitutional.
Our state judges do not abandon their oaths to uphold the law when
rendering their opinions. Part VI demonstrates how judges, reined by
the institutional constraints of the judicial process, are accountable, and
precluded from reaching decisions solely as a matter of personal
choice.2"
The authors to whom we respond originally posed the question,
"[s]hould tort law be decided by courts or legislatures? ' 23 Part VII
shows that the answer supplied by historical enunciation of tort law in
Illinois demonstrates that both branches have and should contribute to
its development. 24 This article concludes by stating that the courts will
continue to mold the common law by embracing their role as the
constitution's ultimate vanguard and interpreter.
II.

BE WARY OF CALCULATED REFORM RHETORIC: WHERE'S THE

PROOF?

The article to which we reply was developed from an amicus curiae
brief submitted on behalf of the Product Liability Advisory Council,
Incorporated 25 to the Illinois Supreme Court for consideration in its
constitutional review of Public Act 89-7.26 Since 1982, this
organization has written more than 450 amicus curiae briefs as part of
a concerted effort to shape the development of the common law to limit
the liability exposure of its diverse manufacturer members.2 7 Their
Illinois brief was designed to present its proponents' fundamental
argument that the legislature, as the creator of tort law, has the
supreme power to enact any tort law, including tort reform.2 8
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
Schwartz et al., supra note 2, at 745.
See infra Part VII.
See Schwartz et al., supra note 2, at 745. The Product Liability Advisory Council,

Inc. has a membership of over 100 major manufacturers, representing a broad crosssection of American industry. Its corporate members include manufacturers and sellers in
industries ranging from electronics to automobiles to pharmaceutical products. In
addition, 300 sustaining members include product liability defense attorneys from
across the country. See Amicus Curiae Brief of Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc.
for the Defendants-Appellants at 1. Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Il.
1997) (Nos. 81890, 81891, 81892 and 81893 (Consolidated)).
26. See Schwartz et al., supra note 2, at 745.
27. Hugh F. Young, The Product Liability Advisory Council: Who We Are and What
We Do, THE METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL, Jan. 8, 1998, at 30, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Mcc file.
28. See id.
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The article29 is also the core of another publication, a monograph
distributed by the Legal Studies Division of the Washington Legal
Foundation.3" This think tank is dedicated to exploration of legal
policy questions in the corporate community. 3 ' It markets its
publications to federal and state jurists and their clerks, members of
state and federal legislatures and their legal staff, journalists,
government attorneys, business leaders and corporate general
counsel.32
The monograph, written by the same authors whom we counter,
concludes that the legislature is the only governmental body that
should make any major change in tort law.33 It asserts that the balance
of power is now tipped in favor of the courts, because courts have
declared themselves the "exclusive oracle" of who can and should
decide tort law. 34 They claim that legislators have been silenced by
judges who "know better" and have used provisions in state
constitutions to nullify attempts by state legislatures to reform
American tort law.35
Careful scrutiny of these three partisan writings reveals their true
message: any decision that declares tort reform invalid requires a
judge, or panel of judges, to stray from their legitimate authority and to
review that legislation on the basis of policy preferences, rather than
the rule of law.36 Tort reformers claim that these judges are legislating
from the bench.37 Under the guise of questionable constitutional
rulings, they maintain that judges have improperly substituted personal
choice in place of the policy judgment of the politically accountable
legislature.38

29. See Schwartz et al., supra note 2, at 745.
30. Victor E. Schwartz et al., Who Should Make America's Tort Law: Courts or

Legislatures?, Washington Legal Foundation, Washington, D.C. (1997)

[hereinafter

Schwartz et al., America's Tort Law].
3 1. See id. at afterward (setting forth the mission statement of the Legal Studies

Division of the Washington Legal Foundation).
32. See id.

33. See id. at 22. The monograph discusses the American Legislative Exchange
Council ("ALEC"), a bipartisan group that developed model legislation entitled the
"Adoption of Common Law Act." See id. The group believed that this act, which makes
the legislature, not the judiciary, the source for creating new tort law, "reaffirms the
historic right of legislatures to make a state's tort law." Id.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 1-2.
Id. at 2, 21.
See id. at 21.
See id. at 21, 26-27.
See id. at 21.
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We ask, why is it axiomatic that all judicial invalidation of any tort
reform measure is illegitimate? Decisions invalidating tort reform have
been castigated as unwarranted judicial activism. 39 Is it not equally
tenable that judges, who find tort reform unconstitutional, are
motivated by a principled commitment to their state constitutions?
The legislative process is not purely democratic. The General
Assembly does not conduct statewide plebiscites, nor should it act
upon the volatile results of each new opinion poll. Bicameralism 4° and
the governor's veto guarantee that not all legislation supported by a
majority of citizens at a given time will become law. 4 ' We elect
representatives to determine what is best for all citizens. Ideally, we
delegate and entrust to our state legislators the responsibility to
exercise independent judgment for the good of all citizens.
When an Illinois statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, the
Illinois Supreme Court reviews that legislative determination with great
care, exercising diligence to avoid substituting its judgment for the
wisdom of the General Assembly.42 In exercising this judicial review,
the court is not the critic of the legislature, but the guardian of both the
Federal and Illinois Constitutions. The fundamental law of these
Constitutions is not subject to the whim of the legislature and may not
be circumvented by lawmakers under the guise of exercising police
power for the good of the people.43
What is the basis for the assertion that state constitutionalism has
run wild? First, the authors acknowledge that since 1983, forty-four
states, including Illinois,' have determined that a wide spectrum of
39. See id. at 2, 26-27.
40. See ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
4 1. See ILL. CONST. art. V, § 8.

42. See Bernier v. Burris, 497 N.E.2d 763, 769 (I11. 1986) (stating that the court's
task is, "limited to determining whether the legislation in question is constitutional,
not whether it is wise and well.").
43. See People v. Tumminaro, 465 N.E.2d 90, 92 (I11.1984). The court stated:
To constitute a legitimate exercise of the police power, the legislative
enactment must bear a reasonable relationship to the public interest intended
to be protected, and the means adopted must be a reasonable method of
accomplishing the desired objective. Once the legislature determines that a
problem exists and acts to protect and promote the general welfare of its
citizens, the legislation is presumed to be a valid exercise of the State's police
power. Furthermore, the due process clauses of the State and Federal
constitutions, insofar as they operate to limit the exercise of the State's
police power, prohibit only its arbitrary or unreasonable use.
Id.
44. The Illinois Supreme Court concluded several tort reform measures enacted by the
General Assembly in 1985 passed constitutional muster, as they were rationally related
to a legitimate governmental interest and did not offend any constitutional guarantee.
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tort reform measures have withstood scrutiny under judicial review.45
What piques them is that twenty-six states have invalidated various tort
reform measures in over sixty decisions, on diverse state constitutional
grounds.46 Apparently, the number sixty is meant to startle the
uncritical reader. The already identified problem is now characterized
by size, demonstrating its allegedly compelling nature. The authors
merely compiled the sixty cases as citations in an appendix, with
reference to the tort reform measures nullified and the state
constitutional provisions invoked." No effort was made to analyze
these decisions. No reasoning from these opinions was supplied to
expose improper application of the rule of law. They were aggregated
as if the fact they exist speaks for itself: these are the courts that have
defied the popular will as expressed by the legislature.
We note, however, that social scientists and academics-who have
analyzed the available, albeit limited, empirical data-find little
evidence to support tort reform as a public policy problem requiring a
governmental response. 48 The perception that change is necessary
persists because highly partisan interest groups do not care what
See Bernier, 497 N.E.2d at 767-79. Among those provisions affirmed were: limitations
on attorneys' fees in healing art malpractice cases did not violate the equal protection
and special legislation clauses, see 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1114 (originally ILL.
REV. STAT. 1985, ch. 110, 1 2-1114); periodic payment of future damages did not
interfere with the right to trial by jury, violate the equal protection or due process clause,
or constitute special legislation, see 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1701 to 2-1719
(originally ILL. REV. STAT. 1985, ch. 110, 1 2-1701 to 2-1719); modification of the
collateral source rule in medical negligence cases was not a violation of the equal
protection or special legislation clause, nor did it offend due process or result in the
impairment of contracts, see 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1205 (originally ILL. REV.
STAT. 1985, ch. 110, % 2-1205); and elimination of awards for punitive damages in
actions for medical malpractice did not violate equal protection, due process or special
legislation clauses, see 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1115 (originally ILL. REV. STAT.
1985, ch. 110,
2-1115). See id.
45. See Schwartz et al., America's Tort Law, supra note 30, app. at B9-B24.
46. See id. at 2, app. at A1-A14.
47. See id.
48. See STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM
252 (1995) (discussing how different research agendas are "likely to also point to a
different set of policy problems than those offered by the reform rhetoric."); Stephen
Daniels & Joanne Martin, Punitive Damages, Change, and the Politics of Ideas:
Defining Public Policy Problems, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 71, 99 (noting that the success of
interest groups in changing the civil justice system "results not from a reasoned set of
arguments based on systematic empirical research, but from a sophisticated appeal to
emotion and the tactical use of passion."); Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know
Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U.
PA. L. REV. 1147, 1149 (1992) (demonstrating the "inadequacy of empirical . . .
[evidence] for drawing trustworthy conclusions about the way the [tort litigation]
system actually performs ....
).
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systematically collected and analyzed data might say.4 9 Truth is not
their agenda.5" Their goal is to change the way people think about a
particular issue.5'
No Illinois court has ever arrogated the exclusive right to make state
tort law. Nothing in the Illinois Supreme Court's rejection of the
Reform Act invokes the rationale that when state courts invalidate tort
reform measures on state constitutional grounds, they substitute their
own judgment for that of the legislature.
Rather, the representative legislature and the judiciary exist side by
side, each performing their own functions, but also sharing some of
the same functions. That was the plan. The proper relationship
between the legislature and the courts is, has been, and should be "one
of cooperation and assistance in examining and changing the common
law to conform with the ever changing demands of the community."52
One of the central premises of our constitutional division of powers
is that primary lawmaking authority belongs to the general assembly.53
If separation of powers means anything, it must be conceded that the
task of creating law belongs to the legislature. Courts must enforce
constitutionally legitimate laws passed by the legislature lest they
arrogate to themselves the ultimate power to make public policy.
Legislative supremacy, however, must be distinguished from
legislative exclusivity. Legislatures are not and have never been the
sole lawmakers. Rather, state courts have the authority to create
common law doctrines which embody their own view of public policy,
subject to constitutional legislative modification.'
Legislative supremacy is really a doctrine of statutory
interpretation.55 The premise is that courts are subordinate to the
legislature in making public policy except when exercising the power

49. See Daniels, supra note 48, at 99.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886, 896 (Ill.
1981) (abolishing the doctrine of "last

clear chance"). The Alvis case was superseded by statute as stated in King v. Petefish,
541 N.E.2d 847, 849 (111.
App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1989), which held that to escape liability
for negligence, the defendant must prove that the intervening act was unforeseeable.
53. See ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
54. See infra Parts III, VII.
55. See William N. Eskridge Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 319,

320 (1989). Eskridge observed that the term "legislative supremacy" has become an
idiosyncrasy in as much as statutory interpretation has become a conceptual
battleground for determining what the precept means and how much policy making
discretion is left for those interpreting or implementing the legislature's statutes. See
id. at 320-22.
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of judicial review.56 Yet, the power of the people-the constitutionis superior to both the legislature and the judiciary. Despite the
legislature's authority to create laws, it may not violate the
constitution. Thus, legislative supremacy is not an effective objection
to judicial review. Judges have the authority and the obligation to
enforce and interpret the constitution.57 The courts were empowered
as an intermediary between the people and the legislature, to keep the
latter within the limits of its authority. 8 The judiciary must say what
the law is.59 There is a distinction between a judicial decision that
establishes a principle of common law, one that interprets a legislative
act, and one that declares a statute unconstitutional. All are appropriate
exercises of judicial power.
III.

THE ILLINOIS RECEPTION STATUTE SUPPLIES No BASIS FOR
ERADICATION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

The prerogative of state legislatures to decide tort law is not
sustained on the existence of reception statutes. 60 Reception statutes
addressed the extent of recognition that should be given by state courts
to English statutes. 61 These declaratory enactments were first adopted
by the colonial and territorial legislatures, and later by the majority of
states. Reception statutes, however, did not "create" tort law.6 2 While
interpreting the Illinois reception statute,63 one jurist candidly observed
56. See Schwartz et al., America's Tort Law, supra note 30, at 21.
57. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); People ex rel.
Billings v. Bissel, 19 I11.229, 231 (I11. 1857).
58. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 at 464 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
59. See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177; Billings, 19 I11. at 231.
60. See Schwartz et al., supra note 2, at 746-47 (noting that the state legislature's
acts to "receive" the English common law provided, in the same legislation, the court's
authority to develop it).
6 1. See Ford W. Hall, The Common Law: An Account of Its Reception in the United
States, 4 VAND. L. REV. 791, 816 (1951) (noting that while some state legislatures left
determinations of the binding effect of English law to the courts, other legislatures
directed courts to recognize as binding all English statutes only until a statutorily
specified date).
62. See Schwartz et al., supra note 2, at 746 (stating that "[s]tate legislatures ... were
the first to create state tort law" when they delegated the authority to create common law
to the states by adopting reception statutes).
63. The Illinois reception statute has read as follows since 1874:
The common law of England, so far as the same is applicable and of a general
nature, and all statutes or acts of the British parliament made in aid of, and to
supply the defects of the common law, prior to the fourth year of James the
First, excepting the second section of the sixth chapter of 43d Elizabeth, the
eighth chapter of 13th Elizabeth, and ninth chapter of 37th Henry Eighth, and
which are of a general nature and not local to that kingdom, shall be the rule of
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that if the statute had adopted the common law of England as of 1607
for state courts, the fourth year of James the First, there would be no
recognition of negligence as a basis of tort liability because negligence
did not emerge until more than two hundred years later.6 Clearly, the
legislature could not "receive," let alone create, law that did not already
exist.
A. History of the Illinois Reception Statute
From the limited legal history available, judges, not legislative
bodies, first declared that English common law would govern the
persons and the region that would later be known as Illinois.65 In
1787, the United States Congress passed an ordinance applicable to
the territory of the United States northwest of the Ohio River.6 6 This
ordinance established a temporary government, headed by a governor
and three judges; judicial proceedings in the territory were governed
specifically by the common law. 67 These government officers were
directed to "adopt and publish ... civil and criminal [laws] . . .best

suited to the circumstances of the district., 68 They were given
authority to adopt preexisting state laws and declare these laws binding
on the territory, but no authority to author laws that did not already
exist in the original state. 69 The governor and judges adopted "a copy
of the original reception statute passed by Virginia in 1776," which
recognized English Acts of Parliament of a general nature passed
before 1607 .70 The Illinois territorial legislature later enacted the same
reception statute practically verbatim.7"

decision, and shall be considered as of full force until repealed by legislative
authority.
5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/1 (West 1993). See generally Amann v. Faidy, 114 N.E.2d
412, 418 (Ill. 1953) (discussing the Illinois reception statute).
64. See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/1 (West 1993) (providing the Illinois reception
statute).
65. See Hall, supra note 61, at 801 (noting this authority was derived from the
Northwest Ordinance). This well-annotated article supplies a comprehensive review of
the legal history behind the reception statutes, and the broad range of problems that
confronted jurists who attempted to determine the extent to which the common law of
England was received and applied in America. See id. at 797-822 (discussing adoption

of English common law and problems in its implementation and interpretation).
66. See id. at 801.
67. See id.

68. Id.
69. See id.
70. Id. at 799.
71.

See id. at 802.
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B. Illinois Courts' Interpretationof the Reception Statute
The few Illinois decisions directly interpreting the Illinois reception
statute have found that it constitutes a declaratory enactment.7 2 Those
decisions consistently reiterate that Illinois courts adopted a system of
elementary rules and general guidelines which are continually
expanding with society's progression, adapting to the "gradual
changes of trade, commerce, arts, inventions and the exigencies and
usages of the country. 73 The common law of England is the law of
Illinois except where it has been repealed by legislation or modified by
custom as found in the decisions of Illinois courts.7 4

This interpretation of the reception statute is appropriate. Since the
original colonies and later Illinois territory became states, political and
cultural attributes have changed. New waves of immigrants have
arrived, society has industrialized, and we await the unknown
adjustments that an unbounded computerized world may impose. The
people governed by today's judicial decisions bear little resemblance to
those who yielded their sovereign power to our state and federal
governments. They still cherish, however, the freedom of their
common law heritage.
The court specifically invoked the Illinois reception statute to
75
restrain judicial expansion of the common law in Amann v. Faidy.
At issue was a fifty-year-old precedent, which, if followed, would
have denied a wrongful death cause of action as a result of negligently
inflicted prenatal injuries.7 6 In conformity with more recent decisions

72. See Amann v. Faidy, 114 N.E.2d 412, 418 (Ill. 1953) (stating that the Illinois
reception statute adopted "not just those doctrines which happened to have already been
announced by English courts at the close of the Middle Ages, but rather a system of law
whose outstanding characteristic is its adaptability and capacity for growth."); Welch v.
People, 30 Il.App. 399, 408-09 (111. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1889) (stating that the Illinois
reception statute "is declaratory of what has been the law by which the inhabitants of
Illinois have been governed ....").
73. Ney v. Yellow Cab,

117 N.E.2d 74, 79 (I11.1954);

see also Kreitz v.

Behrensmeyer, 36 N.E. 983, 984 (I11.
1894) (discussing how "[j]udicial decisions of
common-law courts are the most authoritative evidence of what constitutes the common
law.").
74. See Kreitz, 36 N.E. at 984 (recognizing the court's role in changing the common
law); see also Ney, 117 N.E.2d at 79; Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Stanford, 15
N.E.2d 616, 616-17 (I11.
1938); Kinross v. Cooper, 224 I11.App. 111, 113-14 (I11.
App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1922).
75. Amann v. Faidy, 114 N.E. 2d 412 (I11.1953). In Amann, the defendant

negligently drove his car and collided with plaintiff's car, injuring plaintiff who was
pregnant. See id. at 413-14. The plaintiff-mother alleged that the defendant caused her
unborn child's prenatal injuries, which, in turn, caused his death. See id.
76. See id.
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from courts of last resort in six jurisdictions,77 the court overruled
prior precedent and allowed a cause of action, finding that the former
reasoning underlying the court's fifty-year precedent failed to carry
conviction.78 The defendant, however, still insisted that the Illinois
reception statute supplied an impediment to the court's holding, and
that the legislature was the only proper body to make this
determination.7 9 In response, the court noted that credence to this
contention would mandate that courts could only consider Illinois
statutes and English decisions rendered before 1607 in reaching any
decision.8" Writing for the majority, Justice Shaefer prudently
observed that this construction would drastically change Illinois law. 8
He also noted that this contention was decided over a century before,
when, also interpreting the Illinois reception statute, the court held:
[I]f we are to be restricted to the common law, as it was enacted
at fourth James, rejecting all modifications and improvements
which have since been made, by practice and statutes, except our
own statutes, we will find that system entirely inapplicable to our
present condition, for the simple reason that it is more than two
hundred years behind the age.
C. The Illinois Reception Statute Does Not ProhibitJudicial
Development of the Common Law
The article to which we respond provided no support for the
contention that in Illinois and the forty-two other states that repealed
reception statutes, 83 state courts' power to develop tort law was ceded
to them by these arcane legislative fiats.84 Decisions across the
77.

See id. at 414-17 (citing Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.C. 1946); Tucker

v. Howard L. Carmichael & Sons, Inc., 65 S.E.2d 909, 910 (Ga. 1951); Damasiewicz v.
Gorsuch, 79 A.2d 550, 560 (Md. 1951); Verkenries v. Corniea, 38 N.W.2d 838 (Minn.
1949); Woods v. Lancet, 102 N.E.2d 691, 695 (N.Y. 1951); Williams v. Marion Rapid
Transit, Inc., 87 N.E.2d 334 (Ohio 1949)).
78. See id. at 417-18 (overruling Allaine v. St. Luke's Hospital, 56 N.E. 638, 640
(I1. 1900)).
79. See id. at 418 (noting the defendant's argument that the Illinois reception statute
acts as a statutory bar to this action).
80. See id.
81. See id. ("It is at once apparent that defendant's contention that the only available
materials for decision are our own statutes and English decisions rendered before 1607
would, if adopted, drastically change our law.").
82. See id. (citing Penny v. Little, 4 111.301, 305 (1841)).
83. See Schwartz et al., American Tort Law, supra note 30, app. at C, pp. CI-C13.
84. See Schwartz et al., supra note 2, at 746-47; Steven Brostoff, State Reformers
Find Hope In Arcane Principle, NATIONAL UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH/FINANCIAL
SERVICES EDITION,

File.

December 16, 1996, at 6, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nulife
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country affirm the principle that the reception statutes were never
intended as a bar to a common law court's power to alter or amend the
common law.8 5 These decisions, including those in Illinois,8 6
demonstrate that the reception statutes established an initial body of
law on which the particular state would operate, but were never meant
to limit the courts in their historic role of developing the common
law.87
For example, many reception statutes provide that the legislature
may alter or amend the common law, without expressly stating that the
courts have that power.88 This silence, however, has never been
interpreted to mean courts could not alter the common law, as this
construction would abrogate the very essence of the common law's
judicial evolution. 89 As one court observed, requiring a reception
statute to read "until altered or repealed by the legislature or the courts"
would be redundant because courts have historically always had the
power to evolve and alter the common law. 90

The authors, whose views we counter, have suggested that in
Illinois and the forty-two other states with unrepealed reception
statutes, the state courts' power to develop tort law was temporarily
ceded and delegated to them by these arcane legislative fiats. 9 1 They
85. For an excellent discussion and compilation of these cases, see Morningstar v.
Black and Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 671-74 (W. Va. 1979) (citing Chilcott v.
Hart, 45 P. 391, 395-98 (Colo. 1896); Amann v. Faidy, 144 N.E.2d 412 (111. 1953);
Ketelsen v. Stilz, Ill N.E. 423 (Ind. 1916); City of Louisville v. Chapman, 413 S.W.2d
74 (Ky. 1967); Latz v. Latz, 272 A.2d 435, 441 (Mo. 1971); Williams v. Miles, 94
N.W. 705, 708 (Neb. 1903); Trustees of Town of Bookhaven v. Smith, 80 N.E. 665,
666-67 (N.Y. 1907); Carson v. Blazer, 8 Pa. (2 Binn.) 475, 484 (1810); Baring v.
Reeder, II Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 154, 161-3 (1806); Bielski v. Schulze, 114 N.W.2d 105

(Wis. 1963)).
In Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio St. 387 (1853), the court held English common law was

part of the common law of Ohio, to the extent it is "suitable to the condition and
business" of its people and the "letter and spirit of our Federal and State constitutions
and statutes." Id. at 390. "But wherever it has been found wanting, in either of these
requisites, our courts have not hesitated to modify it to suit our circumstances, or, if
necessary, wholly to depart from it." Id.
86. See Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Stanford, 15 N.E.2d 616, 616-17 (I11. App.
Ct. 1st Dist. 1938) (declaring that Illinois law is based on the common law of England
except where it has been changed by the legislature or judiciary); see also People v.
Gersch, 553 N.E.2d 281, 286 (Ill. 1991) (recognizing judiciary's role in changing
established principles of common law).
87. See Stanford, 15 N.E.2d at 616-17; Gersch, 553 N.E.2d at 286.
88. See Schwartz et al., American Tort Law, supra note 30, at app. C (listing state
reception statutes).
89. See Morningstar, 253 S.E.2d at 674-75.
90. See id. at 674.
9 1. See Schwartz et al., supra note 2, at 746-7; Brostoff, supra note 84, at 6.
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assert that when legislatures retrieve their power to change existing tort
law, courts must defer to that authority. 92
This argument must fail because common law judicial authority is
not a grant from the legislature, but an inherent judicial power
protected by the separation of powers principle.93 State courts have
been the articulators and the keepers of the common law since the
founding of the republic. The judiciary has never needed the
authorization of the legislature to fulfill this role. 94
In the wake of the Illinois Supreme Court's resounding rejection of
the Reform Act, general counsel for the Product Liability Advisory
Council has claimed that the court ignored this group's request in its
amicus curiae brief to address the reception statute and its express
grant of authority to the legislature to change the common law. 95 This
is incorrect. Not only did the court acknowledge that the General
Assembly has the power to change Illinois common law, but the
plaintiffs did not dispute that fact. 96 Justice McMorrow, writing for
the majority, however, cogently observed that "[t]he legislature is not
free to enact changes to the common law [for which there is no]
rational relat[ionship] to a legitimate governmental interest." 97 The
court found that the tort reform's statutory cap for recovery of noneconomic losses 98 was arbitrary and violated the prohibition of the
special legislation and separation of powers provision in the Illinois
Constitution.9 9 The reception statute does not shackle the exercise of
92. See Schwartz et al., supra note 2, at 749, 761.
93. See infra Part IV.C.
94. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the work of federal courts "is
more modest than that of state courts, particularly in that, a state court has the freedom
to create new common-law liabilities." United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301,
313 (1947) (holding that whether the United States can recover for negligent injury of
its soldiers is fundamentally derived from federal sources and governed by federal
authority, as opposed to state authority, even though Congress had not prescribed a
rule).
95. See Victor E. Schwartz & Barry M. Parsons, State High Court Takes on Tort
Reform: Judicial Nullification of Legislative Action Continues, LEADER'S PRODUCT
LIABILITY LAW & STRATEGY, April 1998, at 4, 6.

96. See Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1077 (111.1997).
97. Id.
98. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1115.19(a) (West 1997).

In all common law, statutory or other actions that seek damages on account of
death, bodily injury, or physical damages to property based on negligence, or
product liability based on any theory or doctrine, recovery of non-economic
damages shall be limited to $500,000. There shall be no recovery for hedonic
damages.
Id.
99. See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1077-79 (holding that the legislature's ability to alter
common law and limit remedies available is dependent on the nature and scope of special
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judicial review, because nothing in the legal heritage of Illinois allows
respect to be afforded to any legislative act which is unconstitutional.
IV.

STATE COURTS SHOULD DECIDE TORT REFORM ISSUES ON
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS

The federal and state constitutions are the heart of American political
theory. As founding documents of our body politic, constitutions are
direct acts of the sovereign people and speak with an authority no other
law can ever attain. Constitutions allow the people to communicate the
scope of the authority that may be wielded by the government on their
behalf. 00 It is to these constitutional values which the people are
bound-values that transcend current preferences and are guaranteed
from erosion by any branch of government. 101
This constitutional heritage has determined that "[it is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is."'0 2 Because interpreting statutes and determining their
constitutional validity is an inherently judicial function vested in the
courts,'0 3 the judiciary has the power to decide whether any given law
is within the scope of the constitutional powers of the legislature.'0 °
Adherence to these precepts relies on three separate, yet
interdependent, mechanisms of judicial review: (1) the federal judicial
interpretation and enforcement of the United States Constitution, (2)
each state's judicial interpretation and enforcement of the United States
Constitution, and (3) each state's judicial interpretation and
enforcement of its own respective state constitution.

legislation, and that the separation of powers doctrine prohibits laws that unduly
infringe on the judiciary's inherent powers); see also discussion infra Parts V.A-C.
100. See James A. Gardener, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism,90
MICH. L. REV. 761, 813-14 (1992) (advocating for a more activist approach to state
constitutional law because a conservative United States Supreme Court was solidified
during the 1990-91 term).
101. See Judith S. Kaye, Dual Constitutionalism in Practice and Principle, 61 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 399, 421 (1987) (emphasizing the importance of adhering to the U.S.
Constitution).
102. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
103. See People v. Brunei, 175 N.E. 400, 405 (Il. 1931) (holding that a statute that
vested the jury in a criminal case with the power to decide fact and law violated the
separation of powers doctrine because determining the law either by interpretation of
statutes or application of common law is inherently a function of the judiciary).
104. See Henson v. City of Chicago, 114 N.E.2d 778, 782 (I11.
1953) ("The power of
the judiciary in determining the constitutionality of laws or ordinances is limited to
deciding whether or not the law is within the scope of the legislative department.").
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The Illinois Constitution's Vital Role in Tort Reform

The tort reformers' urgent call for judicial restraint objects to the use
of state constitutional guarantees to invalidate legislative tort reform.1"5
They assert that judges who rule against tort reform improperly read
personal values into state constitutions to overrule legislative policy
decisions. 10 6 This oversimplification ignores the ample and unique
state constitutional provisions that limit legislative authority. Although
the general contours may be similar, the language used and the values
expressed in each state's constitution actually differ. No two are
identical, and none mirrors the federal outline.
10 7

The vast majority of cases in this country are filed in state courts.
State legislatures and courts create the bulk of the laws which govern
the lives of American citizens. It is only natural, then, that state courts
have primary jurisdiction in these matters and the obligation to enforce
the rule of law in their respective states.
State courts have recognized that their individual state constitutions
can be legitimate sources of distinctive rights or prohibitions beyond
those provided in the Federal Constitution.18 When faced with a

105. See Victor E. Schwartz, Tort Reform: Public Interest and Public Policy in Civil
Justice Reform: What Now?, National Center for the Public Interest, Nov. 1986; States
Have Gutted Tort Reform, Lawyer Tells Alliance, A.M. BEST COMPANY, INC., BEST WIRE,

April 29, 1998, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Bestwr File. See generally
Gavin E. Souter, Proposed Model Act Would Give States More Power to Reform Common
Law, BUSINESS INSURANCE, August 26, 1996, at 25.
106. See Schwartz et al., supra note 2, at 746.
107. Figures indicate that tort suits are a relatively small part of the overall civil
caseload. See CONFERENCE ON STATE COURT ADMINISTRATORS, THE STATE JUSTICE
INSTITUTE, AND THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD

STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1989 (1990) (discussing state court caseloads and trends in

1989). The report acknowledges that the data collection is not perfect. Not all states are
included and statistics for some states are incomplete. Nevertheless, data is represented
to be the "most comprehensive picture available." Id. at 3. The report indicates that
17.3 million civil cases were filed in state courts in 1989. See id. In addition, there
were 223,113 civil filings in federal courts. See id. A "civil case" is defined in the
study as including "all torts, contracts, real property rights, small claims, domestic
relations, mental health, and estate cases" as well as "all appeals of administrative
agency decisions." Id. at 7. It should be noted that almost half of civil cases,
approximately 8.5 million, are filed in the limited jurisdiction courts, which, in many
states, handle small claims, landlord-tenant, and family law. See id. at 5. In other
states, these, along with tort and contract suits, are handled by the courts of general
jurisdiction. See id. at 7. According to the report, while the number of tort cases filed in
state courts in 1989 is listed at 447,374, the number of tort filings in federal court was
only about 44,961 (Statistical Abstract, 1988 figure). See id. (referring to charts).
108. See Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So.2d 156 (Ala. 1991) (holding that
the statute setting $400,000 limit on non-economic damages violated right to trial by
jury and equal protection provisions of state constitution); Lucas v. United States, 757
S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988) (holding that a $500,000 limitation on health care liability
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claim by a litigant who raises a state constitutional challenge to a statute
which adversely affected him or her, the court must decide the
constitutional question in the absence of some other means of
disposing of the case. Nothing exists to bar these courts from
deciding constitutional issues in tort cases on adequate and
independent state law grounds.'0 9
The Illinois Supreme Court stated long ago:
To the judiciary is confided the power and the duty of
interpreting the laws and the constitution whenever they are
judicially presented for consideration. Hence it becomes our
duty to determine what is the meaning of the laws passed by the
legislature, and, also, whether those laws are such as the
legislature was authorized by the constitution to pass.110
It is this general rule which the Illinois Supreme Court embraced when
it accepted its responsibility to determine the plaintiffs' constitutional
challenge in Best v. Taylor Machine Works."'
There is no proof that when state courts overrule tort reform that
those judges are rogues, who rampantly and routinely trample the
alleged will of the majority on tort reform. If the Illinois Supreme
Court was adamantly against tort reform, then how did the 1986
measures-except for a damages cap on malpractice actions and
mandatory pretrial review panels in those cases-pass constitutional
muster?"'12
We, the people, include the electorate and the disenfranchised. The
electorate consists of many constituencies, all clamoring to be heard
and striving to prevail on a given issue. The disenfranchised includes
minority groups, the unborn, resident aliens, the illiterate, and the
apathetic. Our constitutions protect all, even those who do not or
cannot participate in the election of legislative lawmakers.'' 3
damages violated the open courts provision of the state constitution).
109. See generally People v. Duncan, 530 N.E.2d 423 (11. 1988).
110. People ex rel. Billings v. Bissell, 19 Ill. 229, 230-31 (Ill. 1857).
11.
See Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1063-64 (Ill. 1997) ("It is
the court's duty to interpret the law and to protect the rights of individuals against acts
beyond the scope of the legislature . . . . If a statute is unconstitutional, this court is
obligated to declare it invalid."); see also infra Part V (discussing Best).
112. See Bernier v. Burris, 497 N.E.2d 763, 767 (111. 1986).
113. See Joshua Seth Lichtenstein, Abbott v. Burke: Reaffirming New Jersey's
Constitutional Commitment to Equal Educational Opportunity,20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 429,

486 (1991) (citing John Hart Ely, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 82-88, 100-04 (1980)
("The United States Constitution frequently protects the interests of those persons who
are politically powerless - either because they actually lack the right to vote within a
jurisdiction or because they are consistently outvoted by a hostile majority - and
therefore cannot protect themselves.").
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Government should seek to reconcile the views of all citizens. It must
act to safeguard the constitution." 4 When it does not, it is the court
that must protect all, even those who may not know they need its
umbrage. The Illinois Supreme Court accepted its responsibility to
safeguard the constitution in Best when it found that certain provisions
of the Reform Act violated the special legislation clause," 5 the
separation of powers doctrine," 6 the prohibition against arbitrary or
superfluous legislation," 17 and the prohibition against invasion of
privacy. 1' 8
B. History and Interpretationof the Special Legislation Clause
A prohibition against special legislation in Illinois can be traced to
the Constitution of 1848, which restricted the power of the General
Assembly to pass private, local, or special laws." 9 Illinois and other
states which enacted special legislation prohibitions were responding
to "perceived manipulation of [the legislative process] by corporate and
other powerful minority interests seeking to advance their [private]
interests at the expense of the public."'' 20 Despite this ban on special
legislation, small groups of wealthy and influential persons were able
to obtain franchises, subsidies and rule privileges for turnpikes,
canals, river improvements, toll bridges, and railroads.' 2
Recognizing the ineffectiveness of the 1848 prohibition, John
Scholfield, a delegate at the constitutional convention of 1870,
introduced a resolution, 22 which became the special legislation clause,
explaining:
It was not, however, the people that demanded special laws ....
It was in most instances individuals who demanded these special
114. See Peabody v. Russel, 134 N.E. 150, 154 (1922) ("In a constitutional
government, no injury can come to a state greater than the destruction of the safeguards
provided in its Constitution.").
115. See infra Part V.A. 1-2.
116. See infra Part V.A.4.
117. See infra Part V.A.3.
118. See infra Part V.A.4.
119. See ILL. CONST. of 1970 art. IV, § 13 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
120. Jonathan Thompson, The Washington Constitution's Prohibition on Special
Privileges and Immunities: Real Bite for "Equal Protection" Review of Regulatory
Legislation?, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1247, 1253 (1996) (supporting the Washington
Supreme Court's move toward independent analysis of special privileges and immunities
claims under the Washington state constitution).
121. See id.at 1253, n.31.
122. See People v. Wilcox, 86 N.E. 672, 673 (Ill. 1908). Later, Judge Scholfield as a
member of the Illinois Supreme Court, "did much towards settling the construction [of
the Illinois constitution]." Id. at 674.
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laws-individuals who were not satisfied to do business upon a
broad and honest basis upon which all might be equal, but who
wanted special favoritism-chances to plunder the public
treasury or their fellow men-covered up by a private charter to
avoid detection and punishment. Those were the men who
demanded these special laws,
and at their bidding and by their
123
behests they were passed.
Agreeing with this sentiment, delegate Jonathan Merriam added,
"[i]f there be any one thing that the people are agreed upon, it is that
the whole foul system of special legislation shall be wiped out .... It
gives to corporations and individuals' 2extraordinary
powers, benefiting
4
the few at the expense of the many."'
Other delegates at the convention also criticized special legislation:
[I]nstead of establishing and enforcing general principles,
equally applicable to every class of our citizens, giving equal
rights and executing equal duties to and from all, it is little else
than a mass of laws to promote individual or sectional
125
interests-to enrich particular classes at the expense of others.
As adopted by the convention and subsequently ratified by the
people, Illinois' first special legislation provision spelled out twentythree categories in which the General Assembly was prohibited from
passing a local or special law. 2 6 Among them was a provision that
barred the passage of a law which gave a "corporation, association or
individual any special or exclusive privilege, immunity or
127
franchise."'
This constitutional ban remained unchanged until 1970, when
section 13 of article IV of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 eliminated
the laundry list of specific instances of special legislation but retained
the principle that the General Assembly may not pass a local or special
act when a general act may be made applicable. 128 The present special
123. I DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF
ILLINOIS 512 (1870) (convened in Springfield, Illinois on Tuesday, December 13, 1869).

124.

Id. at 576.

125.

Id. at 578. William Anderson spoke in support of Jonathon Merriam's proposal

to adopt a total prohibition of special legislation.

See id.

See GEORGE D. BRADEN & RUBIN G. COHN, THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION: AN
ANNOTATED & COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 203-06 (1969).

126.
127.
128.

ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. IV, § 22.
See In re Belmont Fire Protection Dist., 489 N.E.2d 1385,

1387 (II1. 1986)

(holding unconstitutional as special legislation a statute based on arbitrary population
classifications relating to fire protection district); Anderson v. Wagner, 402 N.E.2d
560, 568-69 (I11.1979); see also BRADEN & COHN, supra note 126, at 225-26

(suggesting replacing the list of specific legislation with general prohibition of special
legislation).
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legislation clause states that "[lt]he General Assembly shall pass no
special or local law when a general law is or can be made applicable.
Whether a general law is or29can be made applicable shall be a matter
for judicial determination."1
This provision is unique. It is the single express limitation in the
legislative article that specifically restricts the lawmaking power of the
General Assembly. 30 More important, however, the new constitution
clearly abrogated the legislature's previous authority to determine
whether a general law could be made applicable. 3 ' Instead, the
judiciary was exclusively vested with this responsibility. 3 2 This
would include review of any tort law enacted by the legislature because
any tort law could be considered special legislation.
Further support for the vitality and historical significance of the
special legislation clause may be inferred from the inclusion of an
33
equal protection clause for the first time in the 1970 Constitution.
Prior to this enactment, the Illinois Supreme Court set forth that the
special legislation clause supplemented "the equal protection provision
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution by
prohibiting the passage of a special law granting to any corporation or
association or individual any special or exclusive privilege, immunity
or franchise."' 134 The framers made an intentional decision that "the
prohibition against the enactment of special legislation should be
retained in the Constitution in general terms to guard against any
attempt" to pass special legislation, 35 despite the fact that they "also
recommended including in the new Constitution an equal protection

129.

ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. IV, § 13.
130. See Samuel K. Grove & Richard K. Carlson, The Legislature, in CON-CON, ISSUES
FOR THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 103 (1970) (describing the prohibition

against special legislation as "the one provision in the legislative article that
specifically limits the lawmaking power of the General Assembly").
131.

See Bridgewater v. Hotz, 281 N.E.2d 317, 321 (I11. 1972) (stating Section 13

"specifically rejects the rule that whether a general law can be made applicable is for the
legislature to determine").
132.

See id.; see also supra note 129 and accompanying text (stating that deciding

whether a general law can apply in lieu of a special law is "a matter for judicial
determination.").
133.

See ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. 1, §2. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty

or property without due process of law nor be denied the equal protection of the laws."
Id.
134.

Grasse v. Dealer's Transport Co., 106 N.E.2d 124, 132 (Il.

1952) (holding

unconstitutional a statutory provision that arbitrarily granted one class of tortfeasors
immunity from liability for negligence without regard to the nature of the acts of the
tortfeasor).
135.

Anderson v. Wagner, 402 N.E.2d 560, 568 (I11. 1979).
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clause."' 36
The special legislation clause, however, differs from the equal
protection clause, regarding the separate requirement that a court must
determine whether a general law "can be made applicable"-for
example, whether there is a sufficient justification for a law's narrow
scope when it is given a full and general application.' 37 As a result of
this requirement, the Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly "reject[ed]
[the] . . . suggestion that the General Assembly has authority to
address a problem by degree" under the special legislation clause.' 38
Illinois jurisprudence has a strong history of holding invalid as special
legislation statutes which discriminate between similarly situated
individuals in the exercise of police power, without adequate
justification or connection to the purpose of the statute. The Illinois
Supreme Court has consistently held that the purpose of the special
legislation clause is to prevent arbitrary legislative classifications that
discriminate in favor of a select group without a sound rational basis
related to a legitimate state interest.
After local governmental immunity was judicially abolished, 3 9 the
legislature enacted a maze of legislation to resurrect the shield of
immunity. 40 Some of these statutes were held unconstitutional as
special legislation because they created an arbitrary and irrational
pattern for imposing tort liability on governmental entities. For
example, in Harvey v. Clyde Park District,'4 ' the Illinois Supreme
Court struck a statute that attempted to establish tort immunity for park
districts but failed to protect other governmental units. 142 The court
136. Id.
137.
138.

See Grace v. Howlett, 283 N.E.2d 474, 479 (I11. 1972).
In re Belmont Fire Protection Dist., 489 N.E.2d 1385,

1391

(Il.

1986)

(rejecting the General Assembly's "authority to address a problem by degree"). See,
e.g., Grace, 283 N.E.2d at 479 (refusing to rule "that the legislature is free to enact
special legislation simply because 'reform may take one step at a time"' [citation
omitted]); Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Assoc., 347 N.E.2d 736, 743 (I11. 1976)

(rejecting the argument that the General Assembly "may select one phase of one field
and apply a remedy there, neglecting others.").
139. See infra Part VII.C (discussing the judiciary's role in the creation and abolition
of governmental immunity).
140. See infra Part VII.C.
141. Harvey v. Clyde Park District, 203 N.E.2d 573 (I11.1964). In Harvey, a minor
sued to recover damages for injuries caused by the negligence of the Park District in
maintaining a children's slide. See id. at 573.
142. See id. at 577. Section 12.1 of the Park District Code provided:
Any park district shall not be liable for any injuries to person or property, or
for the death of any person heretofore or hereafter caused by or resulting from
the negligence of its agents, servants, officers or employees in the operation
or maintenance of any property, equipment or facility under the jurisdiction,
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observed that more was involved than mere differentiation of
governmental subdivisions. Persons injured by the negligence of a
particular governmental entity, a park district, were also classified.' 43
The statute was held arbitrary in the way it permitted or denied
recovery, making it impermissible under the special legislation
clause.' 44 The court found that there was no reason why one who is
injured by a park district truck should be barred from recovery, while
145
one who is injured by a city or village truck is allowed to prevail.
146
Haymes v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago determined the constitutionality of the School Tort Liability Act, 147 which limited tort liability
of a not-for-profit private school to $10,000.14' An identical cap for
public schools had been previously declared unconstitutional. 49 The
Supreme Court affirmed that "[t]he courts of this State must be open to
all those similarly situated upon the same conditions, and where
procedures are provided which are applicable to some and not
applicable to others under substantially like circumstances, and there
are no discernible logical reasons apparent for the variations, they must
fall ....7fl50
The cap in question violated the special legislation provision.' 5 ' A
contrary holding would have created an arbitrary classification among
students, whereby those attending public schools could recover the full
measure of their damages, but those attending private schools would
This was purely an arbitrary
be entitled to only a limited recovery.
1 52
basis.
rational
no
with
classification
A statute which arbitrarily divided injured workers into two classes
control or custody of the park district, or otherwise occasioned by the acts or
conduct of such agents, servants, officers or employees.
Id. at 574.
143.
144.

See id. at 576.
See id. at 576-77.

145. See id. at 576.
146. Haymes v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 243 N.E.2d 203 (Ill. 1968).
147. The statute states: "The amount recovered in each separate cause of action
ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
against a non-profit private school shall not exceed $10,000.00."
122, $ 825(b) (1967).
148. See Haymes, 243 N.E.2d at 207. In Haymes, a minor sued to recover damages
for injuries sustained when he slipped in an unlit cloakroom at school. See id. at 20304. The cap on his recovery at $10,000 was appealed. See id.
149. See Treece v. Shawnee Community Unit Sch. Dist., 233 N.E.2d 549, 554 (Ill.
1966).
150. Haymes, 243 N.E.2d at 207 (quoting Lorton v. Brown County Community Unit
Sch. Dist., 220 N.E.2d 161, 163 (1960)).
151. See ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. IV, § 22; see also ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. IV, §

13.
152.

See Haymes, 243 N.E.2d at 207.
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and differentiated the amount of damages they could recover against a
third-party tortfeasor was also found to be unconstitutional.' 53 Grasse
v. Dealer's Transport Co. examined a provision of the Workers
Compensation Act that automatically transferred an employee's
common law right of action against a third-party tortfeasor to the
plaintiff's employer. 5 4 The Illinois Supreme Court held that the
statute violated the special legislation ban.' 55 In explaining the holding
of Grasse, the Illinois Supreme Court in Best set forth:
[T]he statute [in Grasse] created unreasonable classifications in
which the plaintiff's ability to recover complete compensation
was determined by fortuitous circumstances. The statute divided
injured employees into two arbitrary classes based solely on the
fortuity of whether or not the third-party tortfeasor was also
bound by the provision. One class was deprived of the right to
collect compensatory damages from the tortfeasor and the other
class, which was similarly situated, was conferred such right.
This Court concluded that there was no substantial or rational
difference between the injured employees in the two classes and,
therefore, the statute offended the prohibition against special
legislation. 156
In addition to its unequal treatment of injured employees, Grasse
found the statute arbitrary in its division of third-party tortfeasors into
two classes.5 7 The first included those bound by the new provision
of the Workers' Compensation Act, who were immune from liability
for negligence to employees under the Act and were required only to
reimburse the employer for workers' compensation payments. 158 The
second included all other tortfeasors, who were not immune from
liability for negligence, and were responsible for the full amount of

153.

See Grasse v. Dealor's Transp. Co., 106 N.E.2d 124 (Il1. 1952). The court ruled

that the Workers' Compensation Statute which transferred an employee's cause of action
against a third-party tortfeasor to employer was an unconstitutional, arbitrary
classification of employer and employee. See id. at 135.
154. See id. at 126.
155. See id. at 135. The statute provided:
Where an injury or death for which compensation is payable by the employer
[under Workmens' Compensation statute] was not proximately caused by the
negligence of the employer or his employees, [but caused by the negligence of
another person bound by the Workers' Compensation Act] then the right of
the employee or personal representative to recover against such other person
shall be transferred to his employer. ...
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48 §166 (1947).
156. Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1073-74 (I11.1997).
157. See Grasse, 106 N.E.2d at 135.
158. See id.
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59
compensatory damages assessed under the common law. 1
The court again affirmed the principle that no judicial deference need
be afforded to legislative judgment when the exercise of police power
is arbitrary in Begich v. Industrial Commission. 60 This case took
exception to a provision of the Workers' Compensation Act which
differentiated between persons suffering traumatic loss of an
appendage and those incurring the same loss through surgical
necessity.1 6' The court held that the distinction between traumatic loss
of an arm or surgical removal of the upper extremity after loss of a
hand to facilitate use of an artificial limb was arbitrary and
unreasonable. 62 The court ruled that the loss due to injury was
identical, but the compensation awards were unequal. 63 The
classification, based on the situs of trauma, without reference to
functional disability as a result of the injury, had no reasonable
basis. 164
Grace v. Howlettl65 considered a challenge to Illinois' first attempt
at a no-fault provision for motor vehicle accidents. The amendment to
the Illinois Insurance Code 166 sought to compensate accident victims
more efficiently by classifying insurance coverage on the basis of
various categories of motor vehicles and their usage. 167 The amount
recoverable depended on whether a person was injured by a private or
commercial vehicle. 68 Only owners of private passenger automobiles
were required to purchase no-fault insurance. 169 Additionally,

159. See id.
160. Begich v. Industrial Comm'n., 245 N.E.2d 457 (Ill. 1969).
16 1. See id. at 459. The statute read, "When an accidental injury sustained is limited
to a hand and results in amputation thereof, and such amputation is performed at the
point of election on the forearm for the purpose of permitting the use of an artificial
member, such injury shall be compensated as the loss of a hand." ILL. REV. STAT, ch.
48, §138.8(e)(9) (1967).
162. See Begich, 245 N.E.2d at 459.
163. See id.
164. See id. The court stated that it could not "find a reasonable basis for
differentiating between the appellant's class and those who lost the use of an arm solely
through trauma." Id. at 459.
165. Grace v. Howlett, 283 N.E.2d 474 (Ill. 1972).
166.
167.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, IT 1065.150-1065.163 (1971).
The statute provided that "every policy insuring against . . . liability . . . for

accidental bodily injury or death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership,
maintenance or use of any private passenger automobile registered or principally
garaged in this State" must provide certain minimum coverage. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73
1065.150(a) (1971).
168. See Grace, 283 N.E.2d at 478.
169. See id.; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73 T1065.150(c) (1971) (listing vehicles "not used
primarily in the occupation, profession or business of the insured").
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substantial limitations were imposed on tort recoveries of persons
injured by any other type of vehicle. 7 ' Except in cases of death,
dismemberment, permanent disability or serious disfigurement, the
amount recoverable for pain, suffering, mental anguish and
inconvenience could not exceed the total of a sum equal to fifty percent
of the reasonable medical treatment expenses, if the total of such
reasonable expenses was less than $500.'
If7 2in excess of $500, a
awarded.
be
could
expenses
those
sum equal to
Defendants in Grace claimed that these changes were rationally
connected to a legitimate governmental interest, which included the
"inequitable distribution of compensation among personal injury
claimants," the expense of the judicial process and the excessive
burden on limited judicial resources.'7 3 The court held the no-fault

classification invalid because it created special legislative treatment for
certain motor vehicle users, where a general law could be made more
applicable. 7 4 Although there were many purposes for which
differences between private passenger automobiles and commercial
vehicles would justify dissimilar legislative treatment, the amount to be
recovered by persons
injured by commercial vehicles was not one of
75
these purposes. 1
Justice Shaefer affirmatively recognized that the 1970 Constitution
required increased judicial responsibility for determining whether a
general law is or can be made applicable. He also stated:
Unless this court is to abdicate its constitutional responsibility to
determine whether a general law can be made applicable, the
available scope for legislative experimentation with special
legislation is limited, and this court cannot rule that the
legislature is free to enact special legislation simply because
"reform may take one step at a time.
In Best, all parties placed particular reliance on the ruling in Wright
v. Central DuPage HospitalAssociation.' At issue in Wright was the
legislature's attempt to cap damages at $500,000 "on account of
injuries by reason of medical, hospital, or other healing art

170.
171.

See Il1. REV. STAT. ch. 73 11065.150 (1971); Grace, 203 N.E.2d at 478.
See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73 1065.158(a) (1971).

172. Seeid.
173. Grace, 283 N.E.2d at 477-78.
174. See id. at 479.
175. See id.
176. Id (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc. 348 U.S. 483 (1955)).
177. Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736 (I11. 1976); see infra
Part V.A (discussing Best v. Taylor Mach. Works).
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malpractice." 17 8 Plaintiff argued that this limit arbitrarily classified and
unreasonably discriminated against the most seriously injured victims
of malpractice, but did not limit recovery for those who suffered minor
or moderate injuries because their losses would never reach the limit of
$500,000. 179 Defendants attempted to analogize the cap to limitations

imposed on recoveries in statutorily created actions, and claimed that
the legislature's policy decision that unequal treatment was necessary
180
to deal with an alleged malpractice crisis should be respected.
Defendants maintained "that the General Assembly can set limits on
recoveries by plaintiffs even if the result of such limits is to deny
certain plaintiffs full compensation for their injuries."'81 Further, "the
General Assembly may effect reform 'one step at a time' [and] in so
doing it 'may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there,
neglecting the others,""' 82
. such that the resulting classifications are
"not unreasonable or arbitrary."1 83
The court responded by striking the damages cap, holding that
"limiting recovery only in medical malpractice actions to $500,000 is
arbitrary and constitutes a special law in violation of section 13 of
article IV of the 1970 Constitution."' 84 This decision clearly rejected
any justification for special legislation, which seeks to effect reform
"one step at a time." 185
The primary bases on which defendants in Best sought to justify
section 2-1115.1 were the same arguments that the court found
unpersuasive in Wright two decades before. 186 As the damages cap in
section 2-1115.1 shared the same constitutional flaws as the limit in
Wright, the court correctly concluded on both occasions 87
that the
legislature's action violated the special legislation prohibition. 1
All of these cases affirm that Illinois courts invoke the special
legislation provision to determine whether a law discriminates between
different classes of individuals by using an arbitrary classification
178.
179.
180.
Brown,
181.

Wright, 347 N.E.2d at 738 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73 58.2 (1975)).
See id. at 741.
See id. (citing Hall v. Gillins, 147 N.E.2d 352 (Ill. 1958); Cunningham v.
174 N.E.2d 153 (I11. 1961)).
Id.

182.
(1955)).
183.
184.
(1970)).
185.
186.

Id. at 743 (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489

187.

Id. (citing Davis v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 336 N.E.2d 881 (I11.1975)).
Id. (citing the special legislation clause, ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. IV, § 13
Id. (citing Williamson, 348 U.S. at 489 (1955)).
See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
See infra Part V.A.1.
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which is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. 188
In each case, the court determined that the proposed legislation treated
similarly situated individuals differently, with no rational basis for the
classification. In Best, the court followed the rationale of its
predecessors to determine that parts of the Reform Act contravened the
constitutional interdiction against special legislation. 89
C. The Separation of Powers Doctrine
Each branch of government, be it the legislative, executive, or
judicial, has its own realm of authority, and one branch shall not
exercise the powers that properly belong to a different branch.' 90 The
authority to determine when the separation of powers doctrine has
been violated rests with the judiciary.' 9
The separation of powers doctrine is violated when a legislative
enactment unduly encroaches upon the inherent power of the
judiciary.' 92 The legislature may regulate the court's procedure and
practice, as long as it does not dictate to the court how it must
adjudicate and apply the law or conflict with the court's right to control
its procedures.' 93
Rendering judgment is exclusively a judicial function. 194 The
United States Supreme Court has recognized that remittitur is a
question of law. 195 By tradition, and as an inherent power of the
judicial branch, Illinois courts are to order remittitur when
appropriate. 196 Nevertheless, assessment of damages is primarily an
188.
189.
190.

See supra Part IV.A.I.b.
See infra Part V.A.1.
ILL. CONST. art. II, § 1; see also Murneigh v. Gainer, 605 N.E.2d 1357, 1366-67

(I11. 1997) (holding invalid an attempt to delegate to the judiciary an exclusively
administrative program for collection of blood samples from sex offenders for an
executive purpose).
191. See People v. Warren, 671 N.E.2d 700, 704-05 (Il. 1996).
192. See People v. Walker, 519 N.E.2d 890, 892-93 (I11. 1988) (noting that
although the branches do not act in isolation of one another, there is a limit to "shared"
authorities).
193. See O'Connell v. St. Francis Hosp., 492 N.E.2d 1322, 1326 (I11.1986).
194. See Agran v. Checker Taxi Co., 105 N.E.2d 713, 715 (Ill. 1952) (finding that a
statute requiring every attorney of record be notified at least five days before date of
dismissal order in an ex parte action was too restricting on the court's discretion, and
therefore unconstitutional).
195. See Dimick v. Scheidt, 293 U.S. 474, 484 (1935) (holding that the district court
was without power to condition the denial of plaintiff's motion for a new trial upon the
defendant's consent to increase damages to a specified amount). Remittitur is "[t]he
procedural process by which an excessive verdict of the jury is reduced." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, 1295 (6th ed. 1991).

196. See Richardson v. Chapman, 676 N.E.2d 621, 628 (I11. 1997) (per curiam)
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issue of fact for the jury.197 If a trial judge determines that a verdict is

excessive, she must act to correct the injustice, as remittitur is "a
'
In fact, a trial
judicial determination of recoverable damages." 198
court's failure to order a remittitur where required is reversible
error. 199

D. The ProtectionAgainst Invasion of Privacy
The Illinois Constitution contains two specific references regarding
the expectation of privacy by Illinois citizens.200 The first provides
that the "people shall have the right to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and other possessions against.., invasions of privacy
or interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices or other
means.' 20 I The Illinois Bill of Rights declares that "[e]very person
shall find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs
20 2
which he receives to his person, privacy, property or reputation.,
Debate from the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention that led to
these explicit provisions noted the latter 203 was intended to protect an
individual's privacy from invasions or injuries caused by another nongovernmental individual or company. 20 4 The Bill of Rights
Committee, whose proposed language was adopted by the
Convention, explained in an accompanying report that "it was essential
to the dignity and well-being of the individual that every person be
guaranteed a zone of privacy in which his thoughts and highly
personal behavior were not subject to disclosure or review. 20 5 On the
floor of the convention, Delegate Dvorak listed an "information bank"
(reducing the recovery for expected medical costs while attempting to represent departure
from the findings of the trier of fact).
197.

See Lee v. Chicago Transit Auth., 605 N.E.2d 493, 509 (I11. 1992) (per curiam)

(finding that the jury did not abuse its discretion in awarding a trespasser's estate $3
million).
198. Carter v. Kirk, 628 N.E.2d 318, 324 (I11.App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1993) (emphasis
added) (holding that the defendants who were granted their request for remittitur in
personal injury case did not have standing to appeal trial court's decision not to grant
their alternative motion for a new trial on damages only).
199.

See Haid v. Tingle, 579 N.E.2d 913, 916 (111. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1991) (per

curiam) (stating that if a trial judge determines that a jury verdict is excessive, "the judge
must act to correct the injustice.").
200.
201.
202.

See ILL. CONST. art. I §§ 6, 12.
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6.
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12.

203.

See 3 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

1733-34 (Dec. 8, 1969-Sept. 3, 1970) (providing verbatim transcripts of the
convention).
204.

See In re A Minor, 595 N.E.2d 1052, 1056 (I11. 1992).

205.

3 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 32.
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that "may have all pertinent information about every citizen" as an
arguable "invasion of one's privacy. ' z 6 The Constitutional
Commentary on this provision explains that "[t]he protection against
'invasion of privacy' is new and is stated broadly" and "expand[s]
upon the individual rights which were contained in Section 6 of Article
II of the 1870 Constitution and the guarantees of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
The "privacy rights of individual patients" and "the confidential and
fiduciary relationship existing between patients and their physicians"
are "compelling" interests. 20 8 "[P]atients in Illinois possess ... the
right to rely on physicians to faithfully execute their ethical duties and
thereby protect the confidentiality of the physician-patient
relationship."20 9 Prior to Best, a constitutional right to privacy has
been recognized regarding disclosure of less personal items, including
bank records2 1° and telephone records.2 '
V. BEST V. TAYLOR MACHINE WORKS: THE ILLINOIS SUPREME
COURT AS GUARDIAN OF THE CONSTITUTION, NOT CRITIC OF THE
LEGISLATURE

In Best v. Taylor Machine Works,21 2 the Illinois Supreme Court
held that several provisions of the Reform Act failed judicial review.
Because these unconstitutional provisions could not be severed from
the remainder, Public Act 89-7, as a whole, was held invalid.2 13
A.

The Reform Act FailedJudicialReview

On December 18, 1997, in Best v. Taylor Machine Works, the
Illinois Supreme Court determined Public Act 89-7, the Civil Justice
Reform Amendments of 1995, failed judicial review. 1 4 In its opinion,
the court did not reweigh legislative findings, but identified specific
aspects of the Reform Act which violated several provisions of the
206. Id. at 1530.
ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. I,§ 6.
208. Petrillo v. Syntex Lab., Inc., 499 N.E.2d 952, 969 (I11.
App. Ct. 4th Dist.
1986).
209. Id. at 960.
210. See People v. Jackson, 452 N.E.2d 85, 88-89 (I11.
App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1983).
211. See People v. DeLaire, 610 N.E.2d 1277, 1282 (I11.
App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1993)
(stating that regarding privacy, "the Illinois Constitution provides greater protection
than the Federal Constitution").
212. Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (I11.
1997).
213. See id. at 1069-1100 (holding that the key provisions of the Act were so
interconnected and mutually dependent as to be inseparable).
214. See id.

207.
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Illinois Constitution. 2 5 The 5-1 decision 21 6 represents a broad
consensus. The specific holdings were:
(1)
The $500,000 limitation on compensatory damages for
and
non-economic injury 217 was special legislation21218
9
violated the doctrine of separation of powers;
(2)
The abolition of joint and several liability 220 violated
prohibition against special
the constitutional
221
legislation;
(3)
The credit set forth in Section 3.5(a) of the Joint
arbitrary, and thus
Tortfeasor Contribution Act 222 was
223
unconstitutional or superfluous;
The discovery statutes, which mandated unlimited
(4)
disclosure of plaintiff's medical information and
records, 224 violated the separation of powers doctrine
and was an invasion of privacy.225
Best was a consolidated appeal from two tort actions filed in the
circuit court of Madison County, Illinois.226 In both cases, plaintiffs
sought declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of the
215. See id. at 1069-1100.
216. See id. at 1057. The majority opinion was written by Justice McMorrow. See
id. at 1062. Justice Miller concurred in part and dissented in part. See id. at 1106.
Justice Heiple did not participate. See id.
217. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1115.1 (West Supp. 1998).
218. See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1076-78; infra Part V.A.I.
219. See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1080-81; infra Part V.A.I.
220.

See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1116, 2-1117 (West 1993 & Supp. 1998).

221.

See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1088-89; infra Part V.A.2.

222.

See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 100/3.5(a) (West Supp. 1998).

Tortfeasors

receive a credit which is applied toward their liability to the Plaintiff for the amount of
contribution attributable to Plaintiff's employer, even if this amount exceeds the
employer's liability under the Workers' Compensation Act or the Workers'
Occupational Diseases Act. See id.
223. See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1083-84; infra Part V.A.3.
224. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1003, 8-802, 8-2001, 8-2003 (West 1996 &
Supp. 1998) (providing that any person who claims "bodily injury or disease" is deemed
to waive any privilege between the injured person and the health care provider).
225. See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1093-1100; supra Part IV.D.
226. See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1062. On July 24, 1995, Vernon Best was severely
injured while operating a forklift to move heavy slabs of hot steel. See id. at 1064.
When the forklift's mast and support assembly collapsed, flammable hydraulic fluid
spilled, was ignited and engulfed Best in a fireball, forcing him to jump from the
forklift's cab. See id. He suffered fractures to both heels and second and third degree
bums over 40% of his body, including his face, upper torso, and both arms and hands.
See id. The second case arose out of the death of twenty-year-old Steven Kelso on
December 22, 1995, as a result of injuries sustained when a train struck his car. See id. at
1064-65.
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Reform Act, and partial summary judgment on the ground that several
provisions of the Reform Act violated the Illinois Constitution of
1970.227 The trial court held that fourteen provisions of the Reform
Act were unconstitutional. 228 The matter was appealed directly from
the trial court to the Illinois Supreme Court.229

1. The $500,000 Cap on Non-economic Damages Violated the
Special Legislation Clause.
The core provision of Public Act 89-7 was section 2-1115.1, which
imposed a $500,000 cap on non-economic damages in any strict
liability or negligence case, involving death, bodily injury, or physical
damage to property. 230 Thus, the limitation affected only those
individuals for whom a compensatory damage award in excess of the
cap was otherwise found necessary to provide full, fair, and
reasonable compensation by not only the jury, but the trial judge and
any reviewing court.231 Clearly, the more severely a plaintiff was
injured, the greater the disparity and distortion wrought by the cap.232
Citing the journal article to which we reply, defendants argued that
because the General Assembly has the power to change the common
227. See id. at 1064.
228. See id. at 1065. Judge Herndon of the circuit court of Madison County held the
following unconstitutional: the $500,000 limit on compensatory damages for noneconomic injuries, 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1115.1; the allocation of joint and

several liability provisions, 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1116, 2-1117; the
amendments to the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
100/3.3(a), 5; select jury instructions, 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1107.1; the
certification of merit for product liability actions, 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-623;
the statute of repose for product liability cases, 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13-213 (b);

the product liability presumptions, 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-2103, 2-2104, 22106; and the discovery statutes mandating required disclosure of all of a patient's
medical records, 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1003, 8-802, 8-2001, and 8-2003. See
id. at 1062.
229. See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 302(a) (providing that circuit court cases are directly
appealable to the Illinois Supreme Court when a state statute has been invalidated).
230.

See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1115.1 (West Supp. 1998).

23 1. See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1069.
232. See id.; see also infra Part V.A.I.a. for specific examples of the discriminating
effect of the damages cap. Ironically, although section 2-1115.1 was applicable to all
tort litigation, its proponents did not seek to limit recovery of damages in all cases.
Excluded from the cap were causes of action dealing with damage to reputation, breach of
fiduciary duty, business interruption loss, intentional interference with prospective
economic advantage, and other business controversies. Even though the most active
group of litigants in Illinois were business entities, whose commercial litigation dwarfs
personal injury claims by a rate of 7 to 1, the Reform Act did nothing to cap damages in
those cases or reduce the incidence of suits brought by these concerns. See Cargill v.
Waste Management, Inc., No. 95 L 7867 at 15 (Cook Cnty. Cir. Ct. May 22, 1996)
(trial court opinion of Judge Kenneth Gillis).
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law, it was constitutional for the legislature to place a limit on
compensatory damages.233 They relied on Grand Trunk Western
Railway Co. v. Industrial Commission,234 which affirmed the
legislature's exercise of its police power to establish a statutory scheme
of workers' compensation to limit liability against an employer when
an employee is injured in the course of employment. 235 However, the
Best court stated that:
[D]efendants' argument assumes too much. The legislature is
not free to enact changes to the common law which are not
rationally related to a legitimate government interest. The
General Assembly's authority to exercise its police power by
altering the common law and limiting available remedies is also
dependent upon the nature and scope of the particular change
in the law.23

The court found that the statutory cap on compensatory damages for
non-economic losses produced arbitrary effects that in no way related
to legitimate legislative goals.237

It is critical to emphasize that nothing in Best or plaintiffs'
constitutional challenge to the Reform Act maintained that the General
Assembly did not have the power to change the common law.238 The

special legislation clause, however, expressly prohibits the General
Assembly from conferring a special benefit on a person or group to the
exclusion of others similarly situated.23 9 As the court has noted in the
past, "to the extent that a recovery is permitted or denied on an
arbitrary basis, a special privilege is granted," which is a violation of
the Illinois Constitution.2 4'
The legislature and the proponents of the cap should have known it
would be subject to scrutiny by the Illinois Supreme Court, which
honors its obligation to conduct meaningful judicial review, including
its explicit constitutional mandate under the special legislation
provision of the Illinois Constitution. When faced with any
constitutional question, including determining whether a particular
statutory provision constitutes special legislation, the court has no duty
233. See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1077 (citing Schwartz et al., supra note 2, at 745).
234. Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n,125 N.E. 748 (Ill. 1919).
235. See id. at 750-52.
236. Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1077.
237. See id. at 1076-78.
238. See id. at 1077.
239. See id. For a discussion of the special legislation clause, see supra Part IV.B.
240. Grace v. Howlett, 283 N.E.2d 474, 479 (I11. 1972) (quoting Harvey v. Clyde
Park Dist., 203 N.E.2d 573, 576 (I11.1964) (finding that a special privilege granted on
an arbitrary basis violates section 22 of article IV of the Illinois Constitution)).
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215

to defer to the judgment of the legislature.2 4'
a. Specific Examples of the Discriminatory Effect of Section 21115. 1's Damages Cap
To demonstrate that the cap was disconnected from the stated
legislative purpose of providing rationality and consistency to jury
verdicts, the Best court carefully documented three examples of
arbitrary classifications created by section 2-1115. 1's damages cap.242
The first classification divided injured individuals into those who
were slightly injured and those who were severely injured. 4 3 It did
not guarantee substantially similar treatment of persons sustaining
injuries for which compensation was assessed at less than $500,000.
For example, a jury could award hypothetical plaintiff A $100,000 in
compensatory damages for one month of pain and suffering and
plaintiff B $100,000 for one year of pain and suffering.2 44 These
inconsistent determinations demonstrated that section 2-1 115.1's
legislative purpose of providing consistency to jury awards was not
met.24 5 Rather, moderately injured plaintiff A could receive the same
sum as severely injured plaintiff B. Also consider the situation where
plaintiff C was awarded $1 million in compensatory damages for a
lifetime of pain and suffering from a permanent disability. 46 Section
2-1 115.1 automatically and arbitrarily reduced the award for this
permanent disability to $500,000, regardless of whether the verdict
was reasonable or fair before the reduction.2 47 Tortfeasors were also
arbitrarily treated inconsistently under this classification. The
tortfeasor who injured plaintiff C paid only a part of the damages for
which he was responsible, while the tortfeasors who injured plaintiffs
A and B were liable for the full compensatory amount.248
The second legislative classification distinguished between persons
who suffered identical injuries.2 49 A hypothetical plaintiff, who lost a
241. See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text (discussing the court's role in
the special legislation clause).
242. See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1075-76. These classifications and the examples
illustrating them were offered by plaintiffs at oral argument to demonstrate how the cap
is disconnected from the stated legislative purpose. See id. at 1075.
243. See id. at 1075.
244. See id.
245. See id. The preamble to the Reform Act contains eighteen specific "findings"
and eight listed "purposes," as identified in the Best decision. See id. at 1067.
246. See id. at 1075.
247. See id.
248. See id.
249. See id.
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leg in one accident and later had his other leg amputated as a result of a
different incident, could recover in full two jury awards of $400,000
in non-economic damages in separate, unrelated actions, totaling
$800,000.20 On the other hand, if the same individual suffered the
exact same injury, the loss of two legs, but sustained his injury in a
single accident, would be unable to recover an $800,000 award for
non-economic compensatory damages because of the arbitrary limit
imposed by the cap.251
The third classification irrationally discriminated among different
types of injuries. 2 2 The alleged purpose of the Reform Act in limiting
non-economic damages was general in nature and supposedly
applicable to all tort litigation. 253 Nevertheless, section 2-11 15.1
mandated that the cap applied only to non-economic loss in tort claims
dealing with death, bodily injury or property damage.254 Other claims
involving non-economic loss remained unaffected by the statute,
including invasion of privacy, defamation, negligent infliction of
emotional distress, breach of fiduciary duty and damage to
reputation. 255 The speculative nature of non-economic damages for
these torts was not addressed by the cap. Therefore, the statute
arbitrarily discriminated against plaintiffs incurring personal injury,
while the cap did not affect recoveries in these other tort actions. 6
As the above examples demonstrate, the arbitrary classifications
created by section 2-1115.1 violated the special legislation prohibition. 7 It was entirely proper for the judiciary to determine that this
provision of the Reform Act was unconstitutional. 25 8 Summarizing its
holding, the court found:
[T]he arbitrary and automatic cap on compensatory damages
for non-economic injuries in only certain tort cases parallels the
harm of the arbitrary classifications stricken by this court in
250. See id.
251. See id.
252. See id.
253. See id. at 1067. The court noted that "Public Act 89-7 states legislative
'purposes' which relate to the limit on [all] non-economic damages." Id. Also, the court
summarized the general purposes of the Act to include such things as "proximate
consistency in awards . . . reestablish the credibility of the civil justice system, [and]
establish parameters or guidelines for non-economic damages." Id.
254. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-111.1 (West Supp. 1998); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/2-1115.1(a) (West Supp. 1998).
255. See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1076.
256. See id.
257. See id.
258. See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text (stating that it is up to the
judiciary to decide whether or not special legislation is contrary to current general law).
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Wright, Grace, and Grasse. Therefore, the $500,000 limit does
not reestablish the credibility of the tort system, and does
nothing to assist the trier of fact in determining appropriate
damages for non-economic injuries. The limitation actually
undermines the stated goal of providing
consistency and
259
rationality to the civil justice system.
b. The Damages Cap Violated the Separation of Powers Doctrine as
Courts Are Authorized to Reduce Excessive Verdicts
The substantive limit imposed on the General Assembly by the
special legislation prohibition was not the only basis invoked by the
Illinois Supreme Court to invalidate the arbitrary non-economic
damages ceiling. 26 ° Plaintiffs argued, 261 and the court agreed, that the
cap imposed a legislative remittitur.2 6 z By fiat, the legislature
automatically reduced as a matter of law any determination of noneconomic damages by a jury in excess of $500,000.263
The General Assembly's attempt to mandate legal conclusions was
firmly rebuked.2 64 The mandatory $500,000 cap on compensatory
damages for non-economic injuries undercut the judges' traditional
remittitur power. 265 It operated to directly alter outcomes by
substituting a predetermined formula for the jury's determination. As
the courts are constitutionally empowered and obligated to reduce
excessive verdicts when appropriate in light of the evidence adduced in
a particular case, legislative reduction, by operation of law, violated
the separation of powers clause.266 This holding is significant because
it circumscribes the authority of the legislature to limit damages, even
if a non-arbitrary, nondiscriminating scheme was developed that could
pass the rational basis test.
2. Abolition of Joint and Several Liability Violated the Special
Legislation Clause
For more than a century, Illinois has recognized the common law
259. Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1076. For a discussion of Grasse, see supra notes 154-159
and accompanying text. For a discussion of Grace, see supra notes 165-76 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of Wright, see supra notes 177-87 and
accompanying text.
260. See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1081.
261. See id. at 1078.
262. See id. at 1080. See also supra note 195 (for a definition of remittitur).
263. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1115.1(a) (West Supp. 1998).
264. See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1081 (recognizing that the legislature is precluded from
enacting laws that infringe upon the inherent powers of judges).
265. See id. at 1080.
266. See id. at 1081.
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doctrine of joint and several liability, which allows an injured plaintiff
to recover full compensation from any, some, or all responsible
tortfeasors 67 In 1883, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that:
[T]he long and well established principle that where one has
received an actionable injury at the hands of two or more
wrong-doers, all, however numerous, are severally liable to him
for the full amount of damages occasioned by such an injury,
and the plaintiff in such case has his election to sue all jointly, or
he may bring 26his
8 separate action against each or any one of the
wrong-doers.

Illinois' tort reform in 1986 narrowed the application of joint and
several liability for tortfeasors in negligence and strict liability cases,
by substituting a greater than twenty-five percent rule of several
liability.2 69 "Any defendant whose fault, as determined by the trier of
fact, is 25% or greater of the total fault attributable to the plaintiff, the
defendant sued by the plaintiff, and any third-party defendants who
could have been sued by the plaintiff' is jointly and severally liable for
all damages. 27 0 An exception was made for wrongdoers in medical,
hospital and other healing art malpractice cases and malfeasants in
environmental claims.271
The Reform Act abolished joint liability for any tortfeasor in all
actions "brought on account of death, bodily injury to person, or
physical damage to property in which recovery is predicated upon
fault. ' 27 2 A defendant would be held severally liable "only for that
proportion of recoverable economic and non-economic damages, if
any, that the amount of that defendant's fault, if any, bears to the
267. See Coney v. J.L.G. Industries Inc., 454 N.E.2d 197, 204 (I11. 1983),
superseded by statute as stated in Henry v. St. John's Hosp., 536 N.E.2d 221 (111. App.

Ct. 4th Dist. 1989). In defining joint and several liability, the court in Coney stated
"[tihe common law doctrine of joint and several liability holds joint tortfeasors
responsible for plaintiff's entire injury, allowing plaintiff to pursue all, some, or one of
Id. at
the tortfeasors responsible for his injury for the full amount of the damages."
204.

268. Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co., v. Shacklett, 105 I11.364, 381 (Il1. 1883).
269. See Pub. Act No. 84-1431, art. 5, § I (codified at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/2-1117 & 1118 (West 1992)). In view of the holding in Best, the constitutionality of
the twenty-five percent rule is questionable but that will surely be the subject of future
litigation and appellate review.
270.

735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1117 (West 1992).

271. See § 5/2-1118 (stating that any defendant found liable for medical malpractice
or environmental claims will be jointly and severally liable notwithstanding the greater
than 25% rule).
272. § 5/2-1117 (West Supp. 1998) ("Several Liability"). Prior to the Reform Act
this section was entitled "Joint Liability," and since the Reform Act was invalidated,
this provision is reinstated, as well as § 5/2-1118 ("Exceptions").
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aggregate amount of fault of all other tortfeasors., 27 3 A provision was
included for the restoration of joint and several liability in healing art
malpractice actions if the non-economic damages cap was deemed
invalid.274
Proponents of abolition asserted that while it may be unfair for a
plaintiff to go uncompensated for an injury, it is equally unfair to
require a defendant to pay for more than the part of the injury he or she
caused. 275 Responding to this argument, the court set forth that joint
liability is only imposed when all the defendantsproximately cause the
injury.276 Therefore, it is more fair that one of the tortfeasors should
pay the entire cost of damages, if necessary, than for the innocent
victim to go uncompensated.277
Furthermore, the court explained that the doctrine of comparative
fault, which allocates fault among the defendants and the plaintiff,
does not detract from the fact that "[a] concurrent tortfeasor is liable for
the whole of an indivisible injury when his negligence is a proximate
' and the allocation of fault among defendants
cause of that damage,"278
"does not in any way suggest that each defendant's negligence is not a
proximate cause of the entire indivisible injury., 279 Therefore, Best
affirmed the theoretical justification for the imposition of joint and
several liability. The court was unswayed that the existence of a
comparative fault scheme could be asserted to absolve any defendant,
who was a proximate cause of the harm, from responsibility for the
entire injury.28°
The court did not rely on the analysis of joint and several liability
when invalidating section 2-1117.281 Instead, it based its decision
upon the violation of the special legislation clause.282 The preamble to
the Reform Act states that one purpose of the Act is that each party
bear any loss proportionate to its degree of fault.283 Peculiarly, joint
273. Id. § 2-1117(a).
274.
275.
276.

See id. § 2-1117(b).
See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1085 n.7.
See id. at 1086 (citing Coney v. J.L.G. Indus. Inc., 454 N.E.2d 197, 205 (II1.

1983)).
277.
278.

See id. at 1086-87.
Id. at 1086 (quoting Coney, 454 N.E.2d at 205.

279. Id.
280.
281.
282.

See id. at 1086-87.
See id. at 1087.
See id. The court's holding was based on its interpretation of Article IV, § 13 of

the Illinois Constitution, which prohibits the passage of a "special or local law when a
general law is or can be made applicable." ILL. CONST. OF 1970, art. IV, § 13.
283. See Civil Justice Reform Amendments of 1995, Pub. Act. No. 89-7, preamble,
1995 I11. Laws 284, 287.
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and several liability was not abolished in all actions. First, it was
preserved for non-physical injuries, such as defamation, intentional or
negligent infliction of emotional distress, or invasion of privacy.284
Clearly, this was not a general law, but one that provided a special
benefit for defendants in certain types of tort cases.
Second, joint liability in medical malpractice cases was automatically
reinstated if the non-economic damages cap was found invalid.285
Since the cap was held unconstitutional, this provision was activated.
The court concluded that there was no justifiable reason to reinstate
joint liability only in medical malpractice cases.286 Restoration would
supply medical malpractice plaintiffs an exclusive benefit. 287 Unlike
other personal injury claimants, medical malpractice plaintiffs would
not bear the risk of an insolvent or unavailable tortfeasor.288
Defendants in those cases, however, were placed at a disadvantage
when compared with other wrongdoers. In the absence of a damages
cap, this differential treatment was exacerbated, and failed to meet the
proposed legislative goal of proportionate several liability. 289 For
these reasons, the court held section 2-1117(b) preferentially and
arbitrarily discriminated in favor of a select group in violation of the
prohibition against special legislation.
3. The Credit in Section 3.5 of the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act
Was Arbitrary or Superfluous
The Reform Act amended section 3.5(a) of the Joint Tortfeasor
Contribution Act 29 1 to modify the court's statutory interpretation and
284. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1117(a) (West 1992), 1995 I11.Laws at 299
(replacing joint liability with several liability only in actions for death, bodily injury,
or physical damage to property).
285. See § 2-1117(b), 1995 Ill. Laws at 300.
286.
287.

See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1088-89.
See id. at 1088 (stating that "§ 2-1117(b)'s abatement of proportionate several

liability in the context of medical malpractice arbitrarily benefits only medical
malpractice plaintiffs.").
288.

See id.

289. See id. 1088. The preamble of Pub. Act. No. 89-7 states that "it is the public
policy of this State that a defendant should not be liable for damages in excess of its
proportional share of fault." Civil Justice Reform Amendments of 1995, Pub. Act. No.
89-7, preamble, 1995 I11.Laws 284, 287.
290. See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1088-89. For a discussion on the special legislation
clause, see supra Part IV.B.

291. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 100/3.5(a) (West Supp. 1998). "If a tortfeasor
brings an action for contribution against the plaintiff's employer, the employer's
liability for contribution shall not exceed the amount of the employer's liability to the
plaintiff under the Workers' Compensation Act or the Workers' Occupational Diseases
Act." Id.
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resolution of the competing interests between that statute and the
Workers' Compensation Act, known as the Kotecki Doctrine. 92 The
court's statutory construction provided that if a third-party tortfeasor
brings a contribution action against a plaintiff's employer, the
employer's liability is limited to the amount of workers' compensation
benefits paid. 9 3 Under section 3.5(a), the tortfeasor receives a credit
against his or her liability to the plaintiff equal to the amount of the
employer's percentage of fault, even if the amount exceeds
the
294
employer's liability under the Workers' Compensation Act.
Initially, the court noted that this provision was fundamentally
inconsistent with the abolition of joint liability, which had been
replaced by proportionate several liability. 95 Section 2(b) of the Joint
Tortfeasor Contribution Act sets forth that "[t]he right of contribution
exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has paid more than his pro rata
share of the common liability. 296 Yet, under proportionate several
liability, contribution claims against employers should never be filed
since no tortfeasor would be liable for more than his or her percentage
of fault. 297 The court found it unnecessary to resolve this conflict
between the abolition of joint liability and section 3.5(a), because even
if the two provisions could coexist, section 3.5(a), on its own, was
invalid as arbitrary and unconstitutional.298
Next, the court addressed internal inconsistencies in section
3.5(a). 299 The first sentence limited the employer's liability for
contribution to the amount of the employer's workers' compensation
liability, 30 0 while the second and third sentences set forth that a
tortfeasor seeking contribution would receive a credit for the total
amount of contribution for which the employer was found liable.30 '
292.

See Kotecki v. Cyclops Welding Corp., 585 N.E.2d 1023, 1028 (I11. 1991) (per

curiam) (holding that it is most consistent and fair with the "various statutory schemes"
to mandate that an employer only contribute equal to the statutory benefits under the
Workers' Compensation Act, even though a tortfeasor would potentially not receive full
contribution).
293.
294.
295.

See id.
See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 100/3.5(a) (West Supp. 1998).
See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1081-82.

296. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 100/2(b) (West 1992).
297.

See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1082.

298. See id. "We need not resolve this issue, however, for even if we assume that the
two provisions can coexist, we determine that section 3.5(a) is invalid." Id.
299.

See id.

300. See id.; supra notes 293-294 and accompanying text.
301. See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1082. Pertinent portions of the statute read:
The tortfeasor shall receive a credit against his or her liability to the plaintiff
in an amount equal to the amount of contribution, if any, for which the
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This credit is then applied against the tortfeasor's liability to the
plaintiff. °2 The final clause of the third sentence set forth that the
amount of the contribution credit may exceed the employer's workers'
compensation liability. 303 "Thus, section 3.5(a) is not only inconsistent with section 2-1117,304 it is also internally inconsistent: if the
second and third sentences of section 3.5(a) are given effect, the first
sentence is rendered meaningless," and a "consistent and intelligible
construction" of section 3.5(a) may not be possible.3 5
Even if section 3.5(a) were given an interpretive reconciliation, the
result would give some tortfeasors a "double reduction. ' 30 6 The
amendments permitted a tortfeasor to assert its section 3.5(a) credit in
addition to the allocation of fault supplied under section 2-1117, °7
producing a "double reduction" of a plaintiff's recovery as a result of
his employer's fault.30 8 The court illustrated this effect with a
hypothetical. 3 9 Assume that an injury, which warranted a $500,000
recovery, was caused equally by the injured's employer and a thirdparty tortfeasor. As the tortfeasor was 50% at fault, his liability was
reduced to $250,000, in accordance with the principle of proportionate
liability. This same tortfeasor was then entitled to a section 3.5(a)
credit equal to the employer's 50% share of fault, which was an
additional $250,000.1 ° The "double reduction" completely eliminated
plaintiff's recovery. 31 1 The court could find no guidance in the House

employer is found liable to that tortfeasor, even if the amount exceeds the
employer's liability under the Workers' Compensation Act or the Workers'
Occupational Diseases Act. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 100/3.5(a) (West
1996).
Id.
302. See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1082.
303. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 100/3.5(a) (West 1996). The clause states,
"even if the amount exceeds the employer's liability under the Workers' Compensation
Act or the Workers' Occupational Diseases Act." Id.
304. See supra notes 267-90 and accompanying text. The act states that "any
defendants found liable shall be jointly and severally liable . . . " Civil Justice Reform
Amendments of 1995, Pub. Act No. 89-7, § 2-1117(b), 1995 Ill. Laws 284, 300.
305. Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1082.
306. See id. at 1083.
307. See supra notes 299-305 and accompanying text. "[A] defendant is severally
liable only and is liable only for that proportion of recoverable economic and noneconomic damages, if any, that the amount of that defendant's fault, if any, bears to the
aggregate amount of fault of all other tortfeasors." 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1117
(West 1996).
308. See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1083.
309. See id.
310. See id.
311. See id.
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proceedings to aid it in interpretation to resolve this issue. 312 Any
33
other construction would lead to the section never being applied. 1
This would render the law a nullity and entirely superfluous.3 14 Thus,
the court held that the credit in section 3.5(a) was "arbitrary and

unconstitutional."315
4. Mandatory Disclosure of Medical Records Violated the Separation
of Powers Provision and the Right of Privacy
Finally, the court held unconstitutional certain physician-patient
disclosure requirements.31 6 Prior to the Reform Act, Illinois adhered
to the Petrillo Doctrine,3" 7 which is a common law rule that bars a
defense attorney from engaging in ex parte discussions with a
plaintiff's treating physicians. 3 " This tactic was condemned in
recognition of a strong public policy interest in preserving the sanctity
of the confidential and fiduciary physician-patient relationship.3 1 9
Section 2-1003(a) of the Reform Act attempted not only to
circumvent this rule, but to mandate that every patient who filed a
personal injury lawsuit agree to unlimited disclosure of any medical
information to any party who requested it.3 20 Best found that these
312. See id. at 1084 (stating that section 3.5(a) was only briefly discussed by the
House and that the comments "provide no guidance").
313. See id. (stating that the credit under section 3.5(a) could not exist under
proportionate several liability of section 2-1117).
314. See id. (stating that in construing a statute, a court's interpretation cannot
render portions of legislation superfluous).
315. Id. at 1084.
316. See id. at 1089-1100.
317. The Petrillo doctrine is referenced in Almgren v. Rush-Presbyterian St. Luke's
Medical Center, 642 N.E.2d 1264, 1269 (I11. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1997); see also Ruperd v.
Ryan, 683 N.E.2d 166 (111. 1994); Karsten v. McCray, 509 N.E.2d 1376 (II1. App. Ct.
2d Dist. 1987) (citing the Petrillo doctrine).
318. See Petrillo v. Syntex Lab., 499 N.E.2d 952, 971 (II1. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1986)
(holding that a physician's ethical duty not to speak to third parties about a patient, as
well as alternatives sanctioned by discovery rules, prohibit a defense counsel from
engaging in ex parte discussions with a plaintiff's treating physicians).
319. See Philip H. Corboy, Ex Parte Contacts Between Plaintiff's Physician and
Defense Attorneys: Protecting the Patient-Litigant's Right to a Fair Trial, 21 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 1001, 1002 (1990) (discussing the role of the courts in defining the scope of
the rule against ex parte contacts within the constraints of confidentiality in the
adversary system, the confidential and fiduciary physician-patient relationship and the
"practical realities of modern personal injury litigation"); see also infra note 351
(providing a definition of fiduciary relationship).
320. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1003(a) (West 1992 & West Supp. 1998)
(found unconstitutional in Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 179 I11. 2d 367, 689 N.E.2d
1057 (Ill. 1997)). The requirements listed were incorporated into numerous amendments
to the Code of Civil Procedure, chapter 735, including section 8-802, privilege between
health care practitioner and patient; section 8-2001, inspection of hospital records;
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alterations of discovery practice in Illinois violated the separation of
powers doctrine and a patient's privacy interest in confidential medical
information.321
Specifically, section 2-1003(a) provided that a person making a
claim "for bodily injury or disease ... shall be deemed to waive any

privilege between the injured person and each health care provider who
has furnished care at any time., 322 This mandatory consent operated
as a waiver of any privilege between the plaintiff-patient and any health
care provider, including disclosure of irrelevant confidential medical
records. 323 Section 2-1003(a) also required that if a plaintiff failed to
supply the requested consent form in a timely manner, "the court, on
motion, shall issue an order authorizing disclosure to the party or
parties requesting said consent of all records and information
mentioned herein or order the cause dismissed., 324 This mandatory
language obligated the court to force a party to disclose confidential
medical information, and if the party refused, to enter an order of
involuntary dismissal.3 25
While Best was under advisement, the Illinois Supreme Court
addressed section 2-1003(a) of the Reform Act and found it
unconstitutional in Kunkel v. Walton.32 6 In Kunkel, defendants
served a request for the mandatory consents.327 In response, plaintiff
section 8-2003, inspection of physician records; and section 8-2004, inspection of
clinical psychology records. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-802, 5/8-2001, 5/82003, 5/8-2004 (West 1992 & West Supp. 1998) (mandating release of documents to
persons holding consents pursuant to §5/2-1003(a)). Since the origin of the challenged
medical disclosure is in section 2-1003(a), this article, like Best, will address that
section. See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1089 n.9.
321. See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1094, 1100. The court stated that, "section 2-1003(a)
impermissibly interferes with the inherently judicial authority to manage the orderly
discovery of information relevant to specific cases. Therefore, the statute violates the
separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution." Id. at 1094. "[T]he privacy
interest referred to in the 'certain remedy' clause of section 12 provides a constitutional
source for the protection of the patient's privacy interest in medical information and
records that are not related to the subject matter of the plaintiff's lawsuit." Id. at 1100;
see also infra notes 348-59 and accompanying text (discussing the Best court's
determination that section 2-1003(a) violated a patient's right to privacy).
322. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1003(a) (West 1992 & West Supp. 1998).
323. See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1094.
324. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1003(a) (West 1992 & West Supp. 1998).
325. See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1094.
326. Kunkel v. Walton, 689 N.E.2d 1047, 1049 (I11.1997).
327. See Kunkel, 689 N.E.2d at 1049. Sandra and Robert Kunkel brought suit
seeking recovery for medical malpractice occurring in the course of Mrs. Kunkel's
treatment. See id. Mr. Kunkel sued under the Right of Married Persons Act, 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 65/15 (West 1994), for loss of consortium. See id. Defendants served
plaintiffs with a request pursuant to section 2-1003 for consent to release medical
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requested a protective order.328 The trial court held that these unlimited
disclosure provisions violated the separation of powers doctrine and
invaded the fundamental right of privacy.329

Defendants appealed directly from the circuit court of Macon
County to the Illinois Supreme Court. 33' That court determined that
the absolute and unqualified language of section 2-1003," 3' which did
not restrict the consent requirement to the injury of the underlying suit
or a related condition, acted as a "condition of proceeding with [a]
lawsuit ' 332 and went "well beyond the legitimate objectives of
discovery. ' 333 The court observed that, "section 2-1003(a) seems to
be designed to discourage tort victims from pursuing valid claims by
subjecting them to the threat of harassment and embarrassment through
unreasonable and oppressive disclosure requirements. 334
In a complete circumvention of the relevance requirements of the
Supreme Court Rules, there was "no reference whatsoever to any form
of judicial oversight or any discretionary power to safeguard against
'
abuse of the consent procedure."335
This impermissibly encroached
"upon the authority of the judicial branch., 336 The right to privacy 37
was also violated because irrelevant confidential medical information
was required to be furnished, with no judicial control over its scope.338
Best expands upon the reasoning supplied in Kunkel. The court
bluntly stated that section 2-1003(a) created "an irreconcilable conflict
with the inherent authority of the judiciary."' " The court has
information.

See id. Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of section 2-1003(a).

See id.
328. See id.
329. See id.
330. See id.

331. See supra text accompanying notes 322-25 (discussing waiver of privilege by
injured person).
332.
333.

Kunkel, 689 N.E.2d at 1053.
Id.

334. Id.
335.
336.

Id. at 1054.
Id. at 1055; see also ILL. CONST. art., 2 § 1 ("The legislative, executive and

judicial branches are separate. No branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to
another.").
337. See ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 6 ("The people shall have the right to be secure . . .
against unreasonable searches, seizures [and] invasions of privacy.
); infra notes
348-59 (discussing the right to privacy).
338. See Kunkel, 689 N.E.2d at 1056. The Kunkel court held that "section 2-1003(a)
makes no provision for any judicial control of the scope of disclosure [and] disclosure of
highly personal medical information having no bearing on the issues in the lawsuit is a
substantial and unjustified invasion of privacy." Id.
339. Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1092 (I11. 1997); see Kunkel,
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constitutional rulemaking power to regulate the judicial system. 340 It
also has authority to manage the court system by prohibiting abuse of
its procedures.341 Illinois judges have the right to control the scope of
discovery in order to balance the interests of parties and to prevent the
compulsory disclosure of medical information irrelevant to the
lawsuit.342 The mandatory language of section 2-1003(a) obligated the
court to become a party to the forced disclosure of irrelevant medical
information.34 3 The court would be compelled to order an involuntary

dismissal, which is an adjudication on the merits, as the sole sanction
if plaintiff refused to comply. 344 Accordingly, Best held that
evaluating the relevance of discovery requests and the limitation of
these requests to prevent abuse or harassment was a "uniquely judicial
function., 345 Section 2-1003(a) interfered with the "judicial authority
to manage the orderly discovery of information relevant to specific
cases." 34 6 Therefore, section 2-1003(a) violated the separation of
powers clause of the Illinois Constitution.347
Best further determined that section 2-1003(a) violated a patient's
right to privacy.348 Specifically stating that "because the legislative
decision to eviscerate" the Petrillo Doctrine was questioned by
plaintiffs in their challenge to section 2-1003 (a), the Best court found

689 N.E.2d at 1052.
340. See O'Connell v. St. Francis Hospital, 492 N.E.2d 1322, 1327 (Ill. 1986)
(holding that a statute requiring dismissal by the trial court under certain circumstances
violated judicial authority to decide cases).
341. See Gibellina v. Handley, 535 N.E.2d 858, 866 (II1. 1989) (holding that a
motion which results in a final determination of a case can be heard before a motion to
voluntarily dismiss the suit in order to curtail abuse of voluntary dismissals).
342. Judicial authority to limit discovery requests and to impose sanctions for
discovery violations is expressly embodied in the Illinois Supreme Court rules, which
mandate that all discovery requests must be relevant to the subject matter of the
litigation. See ILL SUP. CT. R. 201.
343. See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1093.
344. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 273 states that involuntary dismissal, with certain
exceptions, operates as an adjudication on the merits. See ILL SuP. CT. R. 273. As
explained in Best, enforcement of the mandatory disclosure could result in plaintiff,
injured through the fault of another, losing his or her right to recover as a sanction for
failure to provide "the blanket disclosure of all confidential medical information,
irrespective of how irrelevant to the lawsuit and however personal, sensitive or
embarrassing, the confidential medical information may be to the plaintiff." Best, 689
N.E.2d at 1093.
345. Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1093.
346. Id. at 1094.
347. See id. at 1094; see also supra text accompanying notes 45-59, 88-89
(discussing separation of powers).
348. See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1100.
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it "appropriate to examine the rationale" of that decision.3 49 The Best
court held that the "privacy rights of individual patients ' 5 and "the
confidential and fiduciary relationship35 existing between patients and
their physicians ' were deemed compelling interests worthy of
protection.353 "[P]atients in Illinois possess ...

the right to rely on

physicians to faithfully execute their ethical duties and thereby protect
the confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship. 35 4 For
example, in Illinois, a physician may be held liable for invasion of
privacy for revealing confidential patient information to a third
party.355 The physician-patient privilege is strongly based in medical
ethics, as well as the fiduciary relationship between the parties. 6
The court concluded that section 2-1003(a) was unconstitutional on
privacy grounds because it required the disclosure of private medical
information not related to the plaintiff's claim.357 Involuntary waiver
of the physician-patient privilege is limited to methods of discovery
authorized by the Illinois Supreme Court Rules and not to ex parte
discussions among defendants and physicians.35 8 "Therefore,...
patients in Illinois have a privacy interest in confidential medical
information, and ...

the Petrillo court properly recognized a strong

public policy in preserving patients' fiduciary and confidential

349. See id. at 1098.
350. See supra Part IV.D (discussing the right to privacy).
351. In Petrillo, the court explained that a fiduciary relationship exists when "there
is a special confidence reposed in one who in equity and good conscience is bound to act
in good faith and with due regard to the interests of the one reposing the confidence."
Petrillo v. Syntex Labs., Inc., 499 N.E.2d 952, 961 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1986)
(alteration in original) (quoting Neagle v. McMullen, 165 N.E. 605, 608 (Ill. 1929)).
352. Petrillo, 499 N.E.2d at 970. The sanctity of the fiduciary physician-patient
relationship was also explored in Miles v. Farrell, 549 F. Supp 82 (N.D.IlI. 1982);
Witherell v. Weimer, 421 N.E.2d 869 (I11. 1981); Scheueter v. Barbeau, 634 N.E.2d
1325 (I11.App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1994); Testin v. Dreyer Medical Clinic, 605 N.E.2d 1070
(Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1992); Karsten v. McCray, 509 N.E.2d 1376 (I11.App. Ct. 2d
Dist. 1987).
353. See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1100.
354. Petrillo, 499 N.E.2d at 960.
355. See Renzi v. Morrison, 618 N.E.2d 794, 797 (I1. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1993)
(holding that a psychiatrist may be held liable for damages for voluntarily disclosing
private patient communications as a witness for the victim's spouse during divorce
proceedings).
356. See Petrillo, 499 N.E.2d at 957-61.
357. See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1100. The court stated that "we further believe that the
privacy interest . . . provides a constitutional source for the protection of the patient's
privacy interest in medical information and records that are not related to the subject
matter of the plaintiff's lawsuit." Id.
358. See Petrillo, 499 N.E.2d at 959.
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359

B. Severability
360
After ruling on these four specific components of the Reform Act,
the Best court concluded its opinion by considering whether these
unconstitutional provisions could be severed from the remainder.361
Severability is a matter of legislative intent,362 which is determined by
the following test:
The settled and governing test of severability is whether the valid
and invalid provisions of the Act are so mutually connected with
and dependent on each other, as conditions, considerations or
compensations for each other, as to warrant the belief that the
legislature intended them as a whole, and if all could not be
carried into effect the legislature would not pass the residue
independently. The provisions are not severable if they are
essentially and inseparably connected in substance. 363

Although the Reform Act included a severability clause, its presence
was not conclusive, but "serve[d] only to establish a presumption that
the legislature intended for an invalid statutory provision to be
severable." 364
Finding that the Reform Act was a comprehensive piece of
legislation, in which the individual pieces were inseparable from the
whole, the court initially noted the speed with which Public Act 89-7
was pushed through the legislative process. 365 Additionally,
transcripts showed that the Reform Act was "presented to the full
359. Best, 689 N.E.2d 1100.
360. See supra notes 213-25. The four components are (1) violation of the special
legislation clause by the $500,000 cap on non-economic damages, (2) violation of the
special legislation clause by the abolition of joint and several liability, (3) that the
credit in section 3.5 was arbitrary and superfluous, and (4) violation of the separation of
powers provision and the right to privacy by the mandatory disclosure of medical
records. See id.
361. See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1100-04.
362. See id. at 1101.
363. Id. at 1101 (citations and internal quotes omitted) (quoting Fiorito v. Jones,
236 N.E.2d 698, 704 (Ill. 1968) (voiding all 1967 amendments to the Service
Occupation Tax Act upon finding one amendment unconstitutional and the class of
amendments unseverable)).
364. Jacobson v. Department of Public Aid, 664 N.E.2d 1024, 1031 (111. 1996) ("The
presumption will be overcome and the entire provision held unconstitutional if the
legislature would not have passed the statute with the validated portion eliminated.").
365. See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1103 ("It is undisputed that the bill was distributed to
the full membership of the house minutes before midnight on the evening before the
floor debates were to be held .... This lengthy piece of legislation was presented to the
full house for discussion just hours after its distribution, and was put to a vote the next
day.").
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house for vote as a whole, integrated piece, and the presentation of any
modifications or amendments was discouraged. 366 Taking into
consideration the manner in which it was passed, and after examining
the preamble and legislative history, the court concluded that the cap
on non-economic damages was the "centerpiece" of the legislation.367
In support of that proposition, the court cited the exception to the
abolition of joint liability, which provided that if the damages cap was
found unconstitutional, joint liability would not be abolished in
medical malpractice cases. 368 Best found that "this legislative attempt
to single out one class of plaintiffs or tortfeasors for separate
treatment, based on the eventuality that the cap was invalidated,
demonstrates that the key provisions '3of69the Act are interconnected and
mutually dependent upon each other.

The court concluded that the creation of a damages cap and the
abolition of joint liability were the central purposes of the Reform Act
and that "[t]he removal of these two central goals of [the Reform Act]
...defeats, in large part, its raison d'etre."37 The core provisions
were declared unconstitutional, and because they were essential and
inseparable from the remainder of the Reform Act, the court held that
the legislation must fail in toto.371
VI. THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF JUDGES PROHIBITS THEM FROM
DECISIONS BASED SOLELY ON PERSONAL VALUES

As careful scrutiny of Best demonstrates, the court premised its
opinion on well-established principles of Illinois constitutional
adjudication. Whether the conclusion reached coincides with or
diverges from the "personal" opinion of any particular justice is
unknown. After all, how does one verify that any particular judge or
panel of judges has ruled on any issue solely as a matter of individual
choice? The authors whose views we counter hinge their answer
solely on the result. 372 In essence, they claim that any decision which
upholds tort reform under judicial review represents sound neutral
constitutional adjudication, while any decision which invalidates tort
366. Id.
367. See id; see also supra Part V.A.1 (discussing the invalidity of the non-economic
damages cap provision).
368. See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1103.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 1104.
371. See id.
372. See Schwartz et al., supra note 2, at 749-50; Schwartz et. al, America's Tort
Law, supra note 30, at 2, 14, 15.
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reform evinces inappropriate skewing of principles of constitutional
interpretation.3 7 3 We suggest some basis other than result must be
used. A debate that is end-oriented will merely champion a preference,
most likely dependent on the one whose "ox is being gored. 374
Assume, for the moment, however, that judges do invoke
idiosyncratic beliefs as part of their decision making process. Does
this make these judges rabid counter-majoritarian outsiders? Clearly
not, for while judges try to see issues objectively, they must still
examine them with their own eyes. In observing with their eyes,
judges do not abandon their communities, experiences or ideas.
Necessity requires judges to make value judgments when interpreting
the law, but judges must make these assessments in considered and
thoughtful ways.3 75 This balancing is not a fundamental flaw, it is
simply a description of what judges do-they judge! If balancing is
viewed as an illegitimate function of the judiciary, the process is
misperceived.37 6

Exclusion of judges from the lawmaking process should not be
373. See Schwartz et al., supra note 2, at 749-50; Schwartz et al., America's Tort
Law, supra note 30, at 2, 14, 21.
374. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Governmental Interests and Unconstitutional Conditions
Law: A Case Study in Categorizationand Balancing, 55 ALB. L. REv. 605, 618 (1992)
(discussing constitutional and other legal issues in terms of categorization and
balancing and how courts move from one approach to the other).
375. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OFTHE JUDICIAL PROCESS 12-13 (1921).
376. See id. Justice Benjamin Cardozo supplied insight into the methods utilized by
judges to reach decisions, describing the subconscious element of the judicial process.
On this issue the Justice stated:
My analysis of the judicial process comes then to this, and little more: logic,
and history, and custom, and utility, and the accepted standards of right
conduct, are the forces which singly or in combination shape the progress of
the law. Which of these forces shall dominate in any case must depend largely
upon the comparative importance or value of the social interests that will be
thereby promoted or impaired. One of the most fundamental social interests is
that law shall be uniform and impartial. There must be nothing in its action
that savors of prejudice or favor or even arbitrary whim or fitfulness.
Therefore in the main there shall be adherence to precedent. There shall be
symmetrical development, consistently with history or custom when history
or custom has been the motive force, or the chief one, is giving shape to
existing rules, and with logic or philosophy when the motive power has been
theirs. But symmetrical development may be bought at too high a price.
Uniformity ceases to be good when it becomes the uniformity of oppression.
The social interest served by symmetry or certainty must then be balanced
against the social interest served by equity and fairness or other elements of
social welfare. These may enjoin upon the judge the duty of drawing the line at
another angle, of staking the path along new courses, of marking a new point
of departure from which others who come after him will set out upon their
journey.
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premised on their lack of accountability, as opposed to the notion that
the legislature is accountable to the electorate. Judges' accountability
is supplied by the institutional constraints of the judicial and appellate
and ensure that
process,377 which serve to rein in judicial activism
378
whim.
or
lottery
by
results
reach
not
do
judges
First, judges have canons of ethics379 and an oath of office, which
require them to adhere to the rule of law and to uphold their state and
federal constitutions. Second, the structure of the appellate system
38
requires consensus to meet the required concurrence for majority. 1
Judges on these panels confer amongst themselves, sometimes before
and often after hearing oral arguments. Diversity among judges
fosters the development of the law through cross-pollination of ideas.
Out of this "attrition of diverse minds" there is created something
which is "greater than its component elements. 3 81 If not, the decision
will be indeterminate because the court will explain how an opposite
conclusion might be reached by an informed impartial observer.382 In
that case, the opinion provides the seeds of dialogue, not an
imprimatur.
Third, the record limits decisions based on facts pleaded or proven
and legal arguments raised and shaped by counsel.383 If a decision is
377.

See KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION:

DECIDING APPEALS 19

(1960). There are "steadying factors" built into the judicial decision making process
which constrain judges in the adjudication of cases. The final safety valve in the
adjudicative system is that courts can and do correct their own mistakes, and, if they do
not, the legislature can modify or reject their decisions. See id. at 48.
378. See id. at 29.
379.

See, e.g., ILLINOIS CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, ILL. S. CT. R. 61-67 (West 1993

& West Supp. 1998). The canons are:
A judge should uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary; a judge
should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the
judge's activities; a judge should perform the duties of judicial office
impartially and diligently; a judge may engage in activities to improve the
law, the legal system, and the administration of justice; a judge should regulate
his or her extrajudicial activities to minimize the risk of conflict with the
judge's judicial duties, nonjudicial compensation, and annual statement of
economic interests; a judge or judicial candidate shall refrain from
inappropriate political activity.
Id.
380. See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 22(c) (West 1993 & West Supp. 1998) ("Three judges must
participate in the decision of every case, and the concurrence of two shall be necessary
to a decision.").
381. CARDOZO, supra note 375, at 177.
382. See Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH L. REv 827,
847, 891 (1988) (indicating that the modern, heterogeneous American judiciary often
makes judgments on the basis of ethics or policy).
383. See County Board of School Trustees of DuPage County v. Bendt, 174 N.E.2d
404, 406 (I11.
App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1961) (stating that a reviewing court is bound by the
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not supported by strong legal, and relevant factual arguments, the
chance of valid criticism and reversal increases.384 Fourth, and
perhaps most importantly, courts usually supply written opinions.
Unlike legislators, they must demonstrate that their conduct is not the
product of caprice or a back room deal.385 Combined with the doctrine
of stare decisis, judges' obligation to articulate their rationale controls
judicial arbitrariness and promotes consistency among courts. When
applicable, existing case law must be addressed. When necessary to
overrule precedent and invoke public policy concerns, courts must
explain their perception of the public good. Any member of the
tribunal may set out an issue the majority failed to address, or delineate
matters of dispute in a dissenting or concurring opinion. Thus,
judicial opinions are subject to scholarly criticism from the bench, the
bar, the parties and even the press. This dialectic works to restrain
judges and to clarify issues.
Fifth, outside the area of constitutional adjudication, any decision is
subject to reversal or alteration by statute. History demonstrates,
however, that few common law tort decisions are afforded any
attention whatsoever by the legislature. Examples of some decisions
that were given attention are discussed below. These decisions
demonstrate the dialogue that can occur between courts and the
legislature.
VII. THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN DEVELOPING ILLINOIS TORT LAW

Those who sought to persuade the Illinois Supreme Court to uphold
the Reform Act began their argument by asking, "[s]hould tort law be
decided by courts or legislatures? 3 86 We suggest the only logical
answer is that both branches are integral to its development. History
clearly demonstrates that formulation of tort law has never been the
exclusive province of either branch. Nevertheless, tort law's
development has, in large measure, been the courts' domain.387
record of proceedings in the trial court). But see Heb v. Beegle, 481 N.E.2d 846, 848
(Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1985) (stating that only rarely, when an injustice might
otherwise result, may questions of law not argued at trial be considered on appeal).
384. See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Judging in the Quiet of the Storm, 24 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 965, 983 (1993).
385. See Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 599
(1993).
386. Schwartz et al., supra note 2, at 745.
387. See Victor E. Schwartz et al., Stamping Out Tort Reform: State Courts Lack
Proper Respect for Legislative Judgments, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 10, 1997, at S34
("Traditionally most of America's tort law has been common law, developed by courts
through judicial decisions.").
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The History of Interaction Between the Courts and the Legislature

Legislative incursion into tort law occurs infrequently, and is hardly
preeminent. Between 1853 and 1911, the General Assembly
established only five purely statutory causes of action. The common
law provided no remedy for those plaintiffs whose causes of action are
now permitted by the Wrongful Death Act of 1853,388 the Survival Act
of 1873389 and the Dram Shop Act of 1874390 (now the Illinois Liquor

Control Act). The now repealed Structural Work Act of 1907391 and
the Workers' Compensation Act of 1911392 supplied a right of
recovery for injured workers whose actions were previously barred by
the common law defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of
risk, and the fellow servant rule.
Other subsequent legislative codifications of tort actions include the
394
3 93
Animal Control Act, the Domestic Animals Running at Large Act
388. 1853 ILL. LAWS p. 97, § I (codified at 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1 (West 1993
& West Supp. 1998)). The statute reads:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect or
default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had not ensued,
have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in
respect thereof . . . company or corporation which would have been liable if
death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages,
notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the death shall
have been caused under such circumstances as amount in law to felony.
Id.
389. 1871-72 ILL. LAWS 77 (codified at 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/27-6 (West
Supp. 1998)). The statute provides:
In addition to the actions which survive by the common law, the following
also survive: actions of replevin, actions to recover damages for an injury to
the person (except slander and libel), actions to recover damages for an injury
to real or personal property or for the detention or conversion of personal
property, actions against officers for misfeasance, malfeasance, nonfeasance
of themselves or their deputies, actions for fraud or deceit, and actions
provided in Section 6-21 of An Act Relating to Alcoholic Liquors.
Id.
390. 1873-74 ILL. LAWS 262 (codified at 235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-1 to 12-2 (West
1993 & West Supp. 1998)) (providing a right of action to persons injured while
intoxicated against a party licensed to sell liquor, who caused the intoxication of the
injured persons).
391. 1907 I1. Laws 312, § 0.01-9 (codified at 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/0.01-9
(West 1993 & West Supp. 1998)) repealed by Pub. Act. No. 89-2 §5 (1995) (providing
rights of action to persons employed in building and other structural work).
392. 1911 ILL. LAWS 315 (codified at 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/1-30 (West 1993 &
West Supp. 1998)) (providing a purely statutory remedy for employees accidentally
injured at work).
393. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-28 (West 1993 & West Supp. 1998) (providing a
cause of action for individuals attacked and injured by vicious dogs).
394. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 55/1-6 (West 1993 & West Supp. 1998) (providing for
liability for owners of unrestrained livestock that cause damage).
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and the Nursing Home Care Reform Act.395 The existence of these
statutory actions3 96neither precludes nor preempts a common law
negligence claim.

There is no comprehensive tort code in Illinois, nor do we suggest
that there should be. The common law of torts is a rich heritage of
judicial decisions, filled with historical and philosophical perspectives,
examined, explored, and developed by generations of judges.
Deterrence, risk utility, compensation, corrective justice, social
control, and other policy considerations have fostered lively debate,
and because of their dynamism, are difficult to capture in uniform
pronouncements. Certainly, the rancor which has sprung up over the
development of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability

should give pause to anyone who would seek to establish black letter
tort rules.397
395.

210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/1-101 to 3-806 (West 1993 & West Supp. 1998)

(setting out the rights of nursing home residents and a cause of action for damages when
those rights are violated).
396. See Philip H. Corboy, The Not -So-Quiet Revolution: Rebuilding Barriers to
Jury Trial in the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 61 TENN. L.
REV. 1043 (1994).

397. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (defining design
defect, formerly the subject of rich judicial development, as "when the foreseeable risk
of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a
reasonable alternative design by the seller .. . and the omission of the alternative
design renders the product not reasonably safe.").
The American Law Institute's proposal has been criticized for failing to adequately
reflect the legitimate interests of consumers. Further, there is no proof real changes to
§402A were required. See Frank J. Vandall, Constructing a Roof Before the Foundation
is Prepared: The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability Section 2(b) Design
Defect, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 261 (1997). This author observed:
It is not a restatement of the law and does not rest on an evaluation of cases
and policies. It exists merely because it gathered sufficient votes .. .The ALI
has changed and so, apparently, has its mission. The ALI's mission is no
longer to state the law, but rather to issue pro-manufacturer political
documents.
Id. at 279.
See also Marshall S. Shapo, A New Legislation: Remarks on the Draft Reinstatement
of Products Liability, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 215 (1997) (questioning the role of the
ALl in products liability law and pointing to alternative considerations not listed in
ALl); Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products Liability: The ALI
Restatement Project, 48 VAND. L. REV. 636 (1995) (urging that the restatement
"preserve the flexibility of judging and the creativity accompanying it that have been
the hallmarks of the judicial development of American products liability law."); John F.
Vargo, The Emperor's New Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns a "New Cloth"
for Section 402A Product Liability Design Defects-A Survey of States Reveals a
Different Weave, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 493 (1996) (asserting that the majority of
jurisdictions do not require proof of a reasonable alternative design as part of a
plaintiff's prima facie case, and thus the Restatement 3d does not accurately reflect
existing law). Professor Vandall also notes the alignment of some parts of Restatement
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The bulk of substantive tort law in Illinois is found in the common
law. Every day, our state courts delineate the limits of tort liability.
The facts of each case are different and the answers vary, but the
court's function is always the same: to examine the relation of the
parties, and to weigh and balance the nature of the risk and the public
interest. Because issues of negligence and proximate cause are
debatable with the possibility of fair minded persons reaching different
conclusions, the jury has been charged as the tribunal to decide these
questions of fact.3 98

The development of product liability in Illinois and every state was a
remarkable triumph for the common law tradition. No other nation
that made the transition from a rural agrarian society to an
industrialized mass market economy has given a strong voice to
ordinary citizens in determining product safety as has been vested in
our civil juries.3 99 Who could have foreseen that new forces of

production and transportation, provision of public utilities, and
burgeoning rapid growth in the manufacture of pharmaceutical
products would result in devastating injury which required
fundamental changes in tort law? These principles, now called product
liability, emerged slowly, one case at a time, molded by reasoned
appellate decision, state by state, allowing tort law to address the
realities of life outside the courtroom.
Judges, scholars, and advocates devoted the better part of a century
to dismantling the barrier to trial by jury in product liability cases. 4 01
The conceptual revolution it wrought was dramatic, and demonstrated
that common law, even in an age of statutes, could still be a dynamic
instrument of social change.40 2
This achievement alone represents tacit acceptance of the reality that
judges make law - and judges should not apologize for making law.
When judges make this type of policy, they are not abandoning judicial
restraint, but are performing an accepted and necessary judicial
function.403
3d with long-standing tort reform goals. See Vandall, supra, at 273.
398. See Ney v. Yellow Cab, 117 N.E.2d 74, 80 (111.1954) (calling the jury function
of deciding questions of negligence and proximate cause a fundamental right) (citing
Bailey v. Central Vermont Railway, 319 U.S. 350, 354 (1943)).
399. See Corboy, supra note 396, at 1048 (heralding the growth of product liability
causes of action over the last seventy-five years).
400. See id. at 1049.
401. See id.
402. See Judith S. Kaye, The Common Law and State Constitutional Law as Full
Partners in the Protection of Individual Rights, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 727, 734-35 (1992).
403. See CARDOZO, supra note 375, at 11-12 (recognizing the reality of judge-made
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Illinois jurisprudence allows both the General Assembly and the
courts to alter the common law. n"4 Although courts have this power,

they do not routinely exercise it to promulgate broad, sweeping
changes. In fact, reluctance or refusal to act is more common. When
a court is asked to recognize a new cause of action or to abandon a
prior precedent, it does not act sua sponte. Rather, the court makes the
decision to adjudicate the case before it. The parties invite the court to
ignore precedent, overrule a statute or recognize a new frontier. In
these circumstances, the court reviews the origin of the applicable
existing common law rule or statute and examines its own decisions
and those of other jurisdictions, including the reasons advanced for
retention or rejection. 0 5
A change in circumstances upon which the law is based has always
been a justification for updating law by the legislature or the courts, as
neither is the only body which can effect a change. n 6 Nevertheless,
the court does not always accept the invitation. For example, the
Illinois Supreme Court steadfastly resisted a request to abolish the
common law premises liability doctrine, whose multiple classifications
arose in a feudal age when land, as a source of wealth, was held
supreme so that landowners were protected. 407 Although other states
had elected to eliminate the medieval classifications,4 8 Illinois did not
find that circumstances had changed sufficiently to warrant judicial
intervention.40 9 The General Assembly responded soon after, and
allowed general negligence principles to govern the duty owed by an
owner or occupant of property to persons entering the premises,
regardless of whether they were trespassers, invitees, licensees or
law, and the subconscious elements involved in the judicial decision-making process);
see also Charles D. Breitel, The Lawmakers, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 765 (1965)
(describing the uniquely American gap-filling role of the courts in lawmaking).
404. See People v. Gersch, 553 N.E.2d 281, 286-87 (I11.1990).
405. See, e.g., Dini v. Naiditch, 17 N.E.2d 881, 888 (I11. 1960) (analyzing an old
rule with new reasoning and holding that a wife may maintain an action for loss of
consortium due to the negligent injury of her husband).
406. See, e.g., Pashinian v. Haritonoff, 410 N.E.2d 21, 22 (I11. 1980); Renslow v.
Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1252 (I11. 1977); Darling v. Charleston
Community Mem'l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 260 (I11. 1965) (rejecting a social guest's
cause of action against homeowner for personal injuries sustained in a fall because the
court was "not persuaded that conditions have so changed as to require a change in the
[premises liability doctrine].").
407. See Pashinian,410 N.E.2d at 22.
408. See id. (citing Gerchberg v. Loney, 576 P.2d 593, 597-98 (Kan. 1978);
McMullan v. Butler, 346 So. 2d 950, 951-52 (Ala. 1977); Werth v. Ashley Realty Co.,
199 N.W.2d 899, 906-07 (N.D. 1972); Mooney v. Robinson, 471 P.2d 63, 65 (Idaho
1970); Astleford v. Milner Enterprises Inc., 233 So. 2d 524, 525 (Miss. 1970)).
409. See Pashinian,410 N.E.2d at 22.
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If present day realities require a departure from a long-standing
common law principle, there is no wisdom in blindly adhering to the
words and analysis of prior courts to embalm for posterity the legal
concepts of the past. 411 These principles were eloquently expressed by
Justice Bristow, writing for the majority in Dini v. Naiditch41 2 where
the court removed a judge-made obstacle at common law that had
granted a husband, but not a wife, the right to sue for loss of
413
consortium.

In contrast, the Illinois Supreme Court was urged to depart from
precedent and to implement a negligence cause of action arising out of
the service of liquor by an adult host to a minor resulting in an alcohol
related injury or death.4 14 Finding this type of claim preempted by the
Illinois Dram Shop Act, 415 the court held there was no common law
action against any provider of alcoholic beverages for injuries arising
out of the sale or gift of alcoholic beverages.41 6 The Illinois legislature
had created a limited statutory "no fault" liability for dram-shops.4 7
410. See Premises Liability Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 130/1-5 (West 1993 & West
Supp. 1998).
The distinction under the common law between invitees and licensees as to the
duty owed by an owner or occupier of any premises to such entrants is
abolished ....

The duty owed to such entrants is that of reasonable care under

the circumstances.
Id. § 130/2 (originally enacted as P.A. 83-1398 (1984)).
411. Dini v. Naiditch, 170 N.E.2d 881, 892 (I11. 1960).
412. Id.
413. See id. at 893.
414. See Charles v. Seigfried, 651 N.E.2d 154, 155 (I11. 1995). The plaintiff's
sixteen-year-old daughter was killed in a car crash following a party at defendant's
house. Defendant served alcohol to minors, including plaintiff's decedent who was
legally drunk at the time of her death. See id. at 156.
415. See Liquor Control Act of 1934, 235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-1 to 12-2 (West 1993
& West Supp. 1998); Cunningham v. Brown, 174 N.E.2d 153, 157 (Ill. 1961)
(established the rule of law that in Illinois the General Assembly preempted the entire
field of alcohol related liability through passage and amendment of the Dram Shop Act);
see also Hopkins v. Powers, 497 N.E.2d 757, 760 (II. 1986) (holding that the Dram
Shop Act precludes a cause of action under the Contribution Act); Wimmer v.
Koenigseder, 484 N.E.2d 1088, 1092 (I11. 1985) (noting that the statutory "liability
imposed ... does not depend upon fault or negligence, and the damages recoverable are
expressly and exclusively defined in the Act"); Demchuck v. Duplancich, 440 N.E.2d
112, 114 (I11. 1982) (citing Cunningham in support of its holding that the Dram Shop
Act "provides the only remedy against tavern operators and owners of tavern premises
for injuries to persons, property, or means of support by an intoxicated person or in
consequence of intoxication.").
416. See Seigfried, 651 N.E.2d at 165.
417. See Nelson v. Araiza, 372 N.E.2d 637, 639 (I11. 1977) (finding that the Dram
Shop Act does not base liability on negligence or fault).
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The court, however, had consistently ruled that the Dram Shop Act did
not impose liability on social hosts. 41 8 Further, it was not a tort at
common law to sell or give intoxicating liquor to an adult.41 9 Thus,
the court refused to extend civil liability to social hosts, holding that
any move to enlarge the scope of the Dram Shop Act should be
undertaken by the legislature.42 °
Even in the absence of a statute, courts have demonstrated
reluctance to allow every request to expand the limits of tort liability.
For example, the court has refused to recognize a claim for wrongful
life on behalf of congenitally or genetically defective children, who
would not have been born but for the negligence of a health care
provider.42' Plaintiff bystanders are not allowed to recover damages
for emotional distress injuries in a strict liability action, 422 even though
they may recover them in a negligence suit.4 23 Ina DES case, where
the identification of the drug manufacturer was not possible, the court
refused to recognize the theory of market share liability,424 holding it
was too great a deviation from the requirement of causation in fact.425
B. Public Policy ConsiderationsGuide the Fornulationof Tort Law
Illinois law maintains there is no precise definition of the term
"public policy." In general, it concerns "what is right and just and
what affects the citizens of the State collectively. 4 6 It is found in our
constitution and statutes and, when they are silent, in our judicial
decisions .427
418. See Seigfried, 651 N.E.2d at 159 ("[F]or over one century, this court has
construed the Dram Shop Act as inapplicable to a social host situation ....").
419. See, e.g., Howlett v. Doglio, 83 N.E.2d 708, 712 (I11.
1949) ("It was not an
actionable tort at common law to either sell or give intoxicating liquor to 'a strong and
able-bodied man,' and such an act was not deemed to be culpable negligence imposing
liability for damages upon the vendor or donor of the liquor."); Cruse v. Aden, 20 N.E.
73, 76 (Ill. 1889).
420. See Seigfried, 651 N.E.2d at 165.
421. See Siemeniec v. Lutheran General Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691, 702 (Ill.
1987).
422. See Pasquale v. Speed Products Eng'g, 654 N.E.2d 1365, 1373 (111. 1995).
423. See Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authority, 457 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ill. 1983).
424. See Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324, 330 (Ill. 1990) (defining market
share theory as an apportion of damages, according to the likelihood that any of the
named defendants supplied the product, and according to each defendants share of the
market).
425. See id. at 324.
426. Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 879 (II. 1981).
427. See Illinois Bankers Life Ass'n v. Collins, 173 N.E. 465, 466 (Il1. 1930)
(citing People ex. rel. Franchere v. City of Chicago, 152 N.E. 141 (Ill.
1926);
Merchants Trust Co. v. City of Chicago, 105 N.E. 726 (Ill. 1914); Zeigler v. Illinois
Trust & Sav. Bank, 91 N.E. 1041 (111. 1910); People ex rel. Healy v. Shedd, 89 N.E. 332
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Nevertheless, courts do not frequently recognize a new tort to
achieve recognized public policy goals. In one instance where the
Illinois Supreme Court chose to act, it exercised judicial restraint to
narrowly construe the right to recover. We refer to courts' adherence
to the long standing rule that an at-will employee may be discharged by
the employer at any time, for any reason.4 28 A limited exception was
first recognized in Kelsay v. Motorola. Inc.4 29 In Kelsay, the court
allowed a cause of action for retaliatory discharge when the reason for
discharge was the employee's assertion of his rights under the
Workers' Compensation Act, which provides a "comprehensive
scheme . . . for efficient and expeditious remedies for injured

employees."43 That "scheme would be seriously undermined if
employers were permitted to abuse their power to terminate by
threatening to discharge employees for seeking compensation under
the Act."4 3 '

To insure the public policy behind the Act was not

frustrated, the employee needed to be protected from the dilemma of
choosing between keeping her job or claiming statutory benefits to
which she was lawfully entitled.432
In Illinois, the tort of retaliatory discharge was extended outside the
workers' compensation arena in Palmateerv. InternationalHarvester
Co.433 There, a tortious action was allowed against an employer that

fired an employee for volunteering information about another
employee's possible criminal activities to law enforcement
authorities.434 The court supported its decision by citing a public
policy which favors the investigation and prosecution of crime.4 35 In
Zimmerman v. Buchheit of Sparta, Inc.436 however, the court declined
to expand this tort to judicially create a cause of action for retaliatory
(Ill. 1909); Harding v. American Glucose Co., 55 N.E. 577 (I11. 1899)).
428. See Hartlein v. Illinois Power Co., 601 N.E.2d 720, 728 (Il. 1992); Palmateer,

421 N.E.2d at 878; Pleasure Driveway and Park Dist. of Peoria v. Jones, 367 N.E.2d
I11, 117 (I1l. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1977).
429. Kelsay v. Motorola. Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353 (I11. 1978).

430. Id. at 357. Furthermore, the decision manifests the legislative intent of the Act,
as the court states: "[1]n light of its [the Act's] beneficent purpose, [as] a humane law of
a remedial nature." Id. at 357 (quoting Shell Oil Co. v. Industrial Co., 119 N.E.2d 224
(I11. 1954)). By providing employees with such protection and remedies, the Act
"promotes

the general

welfare

of this State."

Kelsay, 384 N.E.2d at 357.

"Consequently, its enactment by the legislature was in furtherance of sound public
policy." Id. (citing Deibeikis v. Link-Belt Co., 104 N.E. 211 (111. 1914)).
431. Kelsay, 384 N.E.2d at 357.
432. See id.

433. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876 (I11.1981).
434.
435.

See id. at 880.
See id.

436. Zimmerman v. Buchheit of Sparta, Inc., 645 N.E.2d 877 (Il. 1994).
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demotion.437
C. Overcoming Stalemates Between the Courts and the Legislature
Infrequently, "the court awaits action by the legislature and the
legislature awaits guidance from the court. 43 8 When a stalemate
occurs, which results in manifest injustice to the public, the court has
held it must act to reform the law to be responsive to the demands of
society.439 It was this mandate that led to judicial adoption of
comparative negligence44 in Alvis v. Ribar,44 1 which abolished the
law of contributory negligence. By the time of the Alvis case, the
legislature had failed to remove the bar of contributory negligence on
six occasions between 1976 and 1981.442 Defendants, who opposed
removal of the common law restriction, urged that this inaction
reflected a deliberate intent of the General Assembly to maintain the
status quo.443 The court noted an equally plausible explanation was
legislative belief that the bar to contributory negligence was
appropriate, considering the history of the doctrine and its judicial
origins, and to wait for the judiciary to act.'
In replacing the common law doctrine of contributory negligence
with the doctrine of comparative negligence, the court explained:
[Where] the legislature has, for whatever reason, failed to act to
remedy a gap in the common law that results in injustice, it is the
imperative duty of the court to repair that injustice and reform
the law to be responsive to the demands of society. 445 Clearly,
the need for stability in law must not be allowed to obscure the
changing needs of society or to veil the injustice resulting from
a doctrine in need of reevaluation .. .[W]e cannot continue to
ignore the plight of plaintiffs who, because of some negligence
on their part, are forced to bear the entire burden of their
437.

See id. at 882.

1981).
438. Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886, 896 (I11.
439. See id. at 893.
440. The definition of comparative negligence states: "[A] plaintiff free from all
negligence may recover from a defendant who has failed to use such care as ordinarily
prudent men generally employ; or, a plaintiff who is even guilty of slight negligence
may recover of a defendant who has been grossly negligent, or whose conduct has been
wanton or willful." Id. at 889 (quoting Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Hammer, 72 Ill. 347
(Ill. 1847)).
1981).
441. Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886 (I11.
442. See id. at 895 (providing legislative history).
443. See id.
1968) (Ward, J.,
444. See id. (citing Maki v. Frelk, 239 N.E.2d 445, 450 (I11.
dissenting)).
445. Alvis, 421 N.E.2d at 896.
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injuries. Neither can we condone the policy of allowing
defendants to totally escape liability for injuries arising from
their own negligence on the pretext that
446 another party's
negligence has contributed to such injuries.
The legislature did not remain idle. Five years later, as part of
Illinois' 1986 tort reform package, the General Assembly substituted a
fifty percent rule of modified comparative negligence and a twenty-five
percent rule of several liability. 447
Illinois entered the world of comparative fault by judicial adoption
of contribution among joint tortfeasors in Skinner v. Reed-Prentice
Division Package Machinery Co. 4 48 The legislature ratified this
decision two years later by codifying Skinner in the Joint Tortfeasor
Contribution Act." 9

While deference to the legislature to initiate a change in public policy
may be appropriate, it is not required, especially when the concept
demanding change is judicial in origin. 45 0 The medieval rule of
sovereign immunity was a judicially created doctrine to confront the
reality that the king could not be sued in his own court without
consent. 41 As there was no court with authority over the king, the
doctrine that the king could do no wrong led to an early enunciation of
governmental immunity. 452 Local governmental immunity was first
adopted in Illinois in 1844, 4" 3 when the Supreme Court held a county
immune from liability for failure to maintain a bridge. It was not until
446. Id.
447. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1107.1, 1116, 1117 (West Supp. 1998)
(held unconstitutional by the Illinois Supreme Court in Best v. Taylor Mach. Works,
689 N.E.2d 1057 (I11. 1997)); see also supra notes 220-21, 269-70, 272-74 and

accompanying text (discussing these provisions).
448.
449.

Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 374 N.E.2d 437 (11. 1977).
See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/0.01-5 (West 1993 & Supp. 1998); supra Part

V.A.3 (discussing the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act). Section 100/2 of the Act
provides in part:
[E]xcept as otherwise provided in this Act, where 2 or more persons are subject
to liability in tort arising out of the same injury to person or property, or the
same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among them, even
though judgment had not been entered against any or all of them.
§ 100/2(a). However, a tortfeasor's right of contribution exists only if he has paid more
than his apportioned share of the common liability and his recovery is limited to that
which he has paid over and above his apportioned share. See id. at § 100/2(b).
450. See Alvis, 42 N.E.2d at 886; Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit School
District No. 302, 163 N.E.2d 89, 91 (111. 1959).
451. See Molitor, 163 N.E.2d at 91.

452. See Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 Term. Rep. 671, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788)
(holding that an unincorporated town was immune from liability for damage caused by a
defective bridge).
453. See Hedges v. County of Madison, 6 I11.567 (I11.1844).
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1959, that Illinois boldly marched into the modern age of torts when
our highest court abolished local governmental immunity, finding the
in
doctrine unsupported by any valid reason and with no rightful place
455
modem society.4 54 At issue was the immunity of a school district.
In response to defendant's urging that abrogation was a matter
solely for the legislature, the court held the doctrine of school district
immunity had been judicially created.45 6 Having found the doctrine
"unsound and unjust," the court had more than just the power to
abolish that immunity, it had a duty to do so.4 57 As courtroom doors

closed without legislative help, the court was free to open
had been
45 8
them.
In the wake of this decision, the General Assembly has acted many
times to erect a pervasive wall of government immunity, 459 resulting in
what is now known as the Local Governmental and Governmental
Employees Tort Immunity Act (the "Tort Immunity Act"). 46° Although
Illinois courts and commentators continue to question the illogical
imposition of liability on individuals and private corporations, while
shielding local governmental entities,46 ' courts continue to exercise
judicial restraint and leave the bounds of local govemmental immunity
to the legislature.462
Certainly, if the Illinois Supreme Court was determined to
adjudicate by invoking personal values, a compelling case was Barnett
v. Zion Park District.463 A ten-year-old boy, while swimming at a
public pool, hit his head on a diving board, fell in the water and sank
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.

See
See
See
Id.
See

Molitor, 163 N.E.2d at 96.
id. at 90.
id. at 96.
id.

459. See STEVEN M. PUISZIS, ILLINOIS MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY §§ 1-1, -5, -6 (1996).
460. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/1-101.1 (West 1993) which reads:

(a) The purpose of this act is to protect local public entities and public
employees from liability arising from the operation of government. It grants
only immunities and defenses.
(b) Any defense or immunity, common law or statutory, available to any
private person shall likewise be available to local public entities and public
employees.
Id.
461. See generally David A. Decker, When the King Does Wrong: What Immunity
Does Local Government Deserve?, 86 ILL. B.J. 138, 139 (1998) (questioning the
imposition of the entire burden of damage due to government's wrongful acts upon a
single injured person, rather than distributing it among an entire community where it
justly belongs).
462. See Barrett v. Zion Park Dist., 665 N.E.2d 808, 810 (I11.1996).
463. 665 N.E.2d 808 (Ill. 1996).
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to the bottom.464 Two pool patrons alerted lifeguards that the boy was
in trouble.4 65 They were ignored, because the guards had not seen the
boy fall.4 66 However, a swimmer dove in to bring the boy to the
surface.4 67 Although resuscitative measures were then instituted, the
boy died.468

The Illinois Supreme Court held that the plain language of the Tort
Immunity Act 469 totally immunized the park district from any

responsibility, not only for negligence, but also for willful and wanton
misconduct in its provision for supervision.47 ° The statute did not
refer to the quality, level or degree of supervision required, nor did it
contain an express exception for willful and wanton conduct. The
majority, recognizing the absurd effect of its literal interpretation,
bluntly asked the legislature to articulate what constitutes "supervision"
" '
or to exempt willful and wanton misconduct from the immunity.47
Two dissents observed the legislature could never have intended
such an "unjust and unreasonable result."4'72 Under the majority

analysis, the law, which should be a haven for children, would allow
any lifeguard to stand by and let a minor drown. 47 3 The legislature
could not have meant to immunize conduct that was not a mere lapse of
464. See id. at 810.
465. See id.
466. See id.
467. See id.
468. See id.
469. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/3-108(b) (West 1993); see also infra note 477
(discussing a proposed amendment to the Tort Immunity Act).
470. See Barnett, 665 N.E.2d at 813. The court stated that the plaintiff had
inappropriately relied upon §2-202 which states "[a] public employee is not liable for
his act or omission in the execution or enforcement of any law unless such act or
omission constitutes willful and wanton conduct." 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/2-202
(West 1993 & West Supp. 1998). This "plain language" does not provide public
employees with immunity for every act or omission while on duty. Barnett, 665 N.E.2d
at 814 (emphasis added). Instead, section 2-202 only provides immunity for a public
employee who "isnegligent while actually engaged in the execution or enforcement of a
law." Id. at 814 (original emphasis).
471. See Barnett, 665 N.E.2d at 815.
472. Id. at 818 (Harrison, J., dissenting). The dissent stated:
When a duty to supervise will be imposed under the law is separate and distinct
from the question of what standard of care is required once the duty to provide
supervision has attached . . . . [T]he duty to supervise must be construed to
mean a duty to provide supervision that is adequate. Otherwise, public entities
could cloak themselves with immunity merely by providing nominal
oversight. As long as someone was present to watch the pool, the statute
would be satisfied.
Id. at 817 (Harrison, J., dissenting).
473. See id. at 817-18 (Harrison, J., dissenting).
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attention, but failure to474respond to a life and death situation for which
lifeguards are trained!
If the Illinois Supreme Court was prone to slavishly overrule
legislation purely on the basis that the judges comprising the court
disagreed with the result mandated by its application, the court would
have interpreted the Tort Immunity Act in some way to carve out an
exception for liability, or, as tort reformers suggest they are wont to
do, found some constitutional infirmity. Although the court did not
overrule the legislation, it did use its intimate view of the interaction
between the interpretation of the statutory text and the facts
surrounding the death of an innocent child to urge its lawmaking
partner to remedy an obvious inequitable and egregious result
mandated by literal interpretation of the immunity statute.475
As evidence of the true cooperation in forming tort law that the
dialogue of a common law decision can achieve between the courts and
the legislature, the General Assembly responded. House Bill 1151,
which was overwhelmingly endorsed by the House of Representatives
and the Senate, would have amended the Tort Immunity Act to create
an exception in cases where there is both a duty to provide supervision
and willful and wanton conduct.4 76 The approved changes did not

create a duty to supply supervision, unless that duty was already
imposed by common law, statute, ordinance, code or regulation.477
On August 17, 1998, this legislation was vetoed by Illinois
Governor James Edgar. In his veto message, he suggested a more
474. See id. at 818-19 (McMorrow, J., dissenting) (stating that an employee's failure
to act in such a situation for which he is specifically trained is not a matter of simple
negligence).
475. See id. at 815.
476. The amendment to 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/1-210 changed section 1-210 to
define willful and wanton conduct as used in the Act to mean "a course of action which
shows an actual or deliberate intention to cause harm or which, if not intentional, shows
an utter indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety of others or their property."
477. The amendment to Section 3-1108, 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/3-108 provided:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, neither a local public entity nor a
public employee who undertakes to supervise an activity on or the use of any
public property is liable for an injury unless the local public entity or public
employee is guilty of willful and wanton conduct in its supervision
proximately causing such injury.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, neither a local public entity nor a
public employee is liable for an injury caused by a failure to supervise an
activity on or the use of any public property unless the employee or the local
public entity has a duty to provide supervision imposed by common law,
statute, ordinance, code or regulation and the local public entity or public
employee is guilty of willful and wanton conduct in its failure to provide
supervision proximately causing such injury.
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precise amendment to apply only to public swimming pools during
designated hours of operation.478 As this chronology demonstrates,
even the executive branch, at times, exercises "lawmaking power."
Whether our state legislature will override the veto remains to be seen.
This cursory review of the enunciation of Illinois tort law
illuminates that the allocation of lawmaking power to both the courts
and the legislature not only works, but usually serves well the citizens
of Illinois. The continued common law development of torts should
not be thwarted because proponents of tort reform secured passage of
a legislative package that the Illinois Supreme Court found invalid
under well settled principles of Illinois constitutional jurisprudence.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

We could briefly sum up our position and state: the good guys
won! Instead, we make a plea for the legislature and tort reformers to
afford our Illinois courts the respect that they have earned, and to
which they are entitled under the law.
Courts are the bulwark that protect our constitutionally guaranteed
rights and powers from dilution and abrogation by the custodians of
legislative power. In the exercise of judicial review, courts are not the
critics of the legislature, but the guardians of the constitution. In this
vital function, courts must not exercise judicial restraint by deferring to
the elected lawmakers. Constitutional protections are not subject to
legislative change in the guise of altering the common law.
Courts exercising judicial review prevent the politically influential
from sweeping away the rights of those with less clout in the
legislative chamber. They maintain a tense balance between popular
will and long-term values. This institution does not need fixing, as it
is not broken. Using the Constitution as their measure, courts can
resist any effort to "constitutionalize" the value system of any single
partisan segment of our society.
Our state constitution serves well our institutional and substantive
values. Illinois Supreme Court decisions interpreting its dictates
should be supported even if one disagrees, and disagrees vehemently,
with a particular result. Judicial review which would sustain special
legislation is a more subtle blow to our freedom than passage of the
statute itself. We cannot allow the adjudication of constitutional law
issues to become a sycophant of partisan interests.
The Illinois Constitution is not an artifact for display. Its continued
478. See David Heckelman, Bill Modifying Tort Immunity Act Draws Veto, Vol. 144
CHI. DAILY L. BULL., NO. 160, August 17, 1998 at 1, 22.
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vibrancy should not be circumscribed by a political debate. It is
inappropriate to attack the judiciary for having ruled a certain way on a
particular issue. This is a blatant attempt to diminish the independence
of the judiciary. It also erodes public confidence in our judges and a
common law system, which deserve much better.
The Best decision was not premised on a mere "precatory relic" of
an earlier state constitution. 47 9 Nor is it the decision of an activist
judiciary which overreached to ensure a policy it preferred. Our state
constitutional guarantees are not hortatory irrelevancies."48 In its haste
to adopt any proposal labeled tort reform, the General Assembly failed
to consider the known constitutional impediments.
Common law is a legal pragmatism and necessity, which enters the
third millennium as it has the centuries before, enthralled to no
particular ideology. Ancient principles of corrective justice combine
with modem considerations of individual autonomy, social efficiency,
and fairness to ensure that our history has a role in forming our current
laws. Our common law courts, as adjudicators, statutory interpreters
and constitutional vanguards, will continue to flourish in the tension
between active democracy, constitutional values and judicial judgment.
The dialectic of this process is our uniquely American legacy.

479. The Washington Legal Foundation lost no time in regrouping after the Best
decision. A Working Paper was disseminated to send this message. See JOHN E.
MUENSCH & ROBERT M. Dow, WHEN JUDICIAL ACTIVISM TRUMPS TORT REFORM: THE
ILLINOIS EXPERIENCE (Washington Legal Foundation, Critical Legal Issues, Working

Paper Series, No. 85 (June 1998)).
480.

See id.

